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The purpose of this study was to investigate the validity of a maturity model for staging the 
capacity of nonprofit community organizations to implement or sustain social interventions or 
demonstration programs.  During the period 1999 to 2001, a five-stage maturity model was 
synthesized using knowledge and experience derived from diverse fields, and applied to small 
nonprofit organizations in an iterative process of (a) application, (b) analysis, (c) revision, and 
(d) re-application.  Two raters with organizational experience, in addition to the developer, were 
trained to use the instrument.   They participated in all phases of the formative development of 
the maturity model.  The resulting estimation of the instrument’s validity is based on convergent 
results of four analyses; (a) content validation by comparison of the new instrument with existing 
instruments assessing capacity to determine the extent to which it assesses important dimensions 
of organizational capacity, (b) construct validation by comparison of an early version of the 
model with a later version to assess its evolution, (c) estimates of interrater reliability among 
three raters, and (d) construct validation through feedback from agency staff and governing 
board members and feedback from staff involved in funding those agencies.  The results of these 
analyses are mixed, not establishing statistical conclusion validity, but showing promise for the 
instrument in its formative stage of development.        
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the validity of a maturity model for staging the 
capacity of nonprofit community organizations to implement or sustain social 
interventions or demonstration programs.  The maturity model is intended to identify and 
organize the important facets of organizational capacity.  The integration of literature 
from a variety of disciplines and usually disparate fields, from theories of organizations 
to theories of change, from human resources and role definition to administration and 
leadership, from cognitive psychology to expertise, and from artificial intelligence to 
evaluation provides the initial delineation of the various features and sub-features of the 
model.   These were extended by the variety of ways foundation leaders and community 
agency administrators viewed organizational capacity through the development and 
initial tryout process.  
 
Researchers in the field have identified a number of instruments to measure 
organizational capacity.  The validity of these instruments, if studied by the authors, is 
usually determined by field tests showing their perceived value.  Some authors provide a 
rationale for their instrument by identifying selected theory and research they used to 
develop it.  Although informative, this presentation is always general and somewhat 
misleading about the knowledge on which the instrument is based and the systematic 
empirical evidence collected.  The problem addressed by  this study will be to document 
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 the validity of the Staging Organizational Capacity (SOC) maturity model and the 
specific attributes indicative of developmental stages, based on evidence systematically 
obtained throughout the development and implementation process.  The remainder of this 
chapter identifies the context from which the organizational capacity of nonprofit 
community organizations arises as an important part of societal change efforts. 
Community organizations have an established role as "laboratories" or "incubators" in the 
implementation of demonstration programs or the conduct of social experiments to 
inform policy making or to contribute to understanding of treatment effectiveness (Iscoe 
& Harris, 1984; Leviton, 1994; Leviton & Schuh, 1999).   Funding agencies typically 
have two major goals for projects in these settings.  One is to make meaningful change in 
the host community or targeted population.  The second is to identify or test interventions 
that developers believe may prove to be effective in other communities to address 
important social concerns, such as improving health care, reducing health risk, improving 
HIV education, reducing interpersonal violence, or reducing homelessness.  When 
evaluations conclude that demonstrations or innovations are unsuccessful or have unclear 
results, decision makers often conclude that the strategy or program is ineffective and 
redirect their support to other areas.  Often, the problem has nothing to do with the 
innovation or underlying concept being studied but, rather, can be attributed to some 
difficulty of implementation caused by agency capacity, or by weaknesses in evaluation 
methods employed.   
Small community agencies are frequently unable to implement programs exactly as 
planned, or to respond rapidly to problems emerging after implementation begins, 
resulting in a mismatch between the planned and actual intervention.  Frequently, 
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 innovations are stated in such broad, general terms that what is being evaluated or how it 
is being measured is unclear or highly ambiguous.  These “molar” constructs are defined 
as large and complex packages, or interventions, taken as relatively undifferentiated 
wholes as opposed to molecular or multidimensional constructs that identify the complex 
array of causal elements that the intervention comprises (Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Lipsey, 1988; Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002).  Such constructs can be problematic for 
evaluation, resulting in findings that fail to find clear differences between treatment and 
comparison conditions in social interventions or, if differences are found, providing no 
insight as to what caused them (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  Case management 
interventions, typically, offer an example of this phenomenon. Within a given case 
management intervention, the mix of services provided to participants may vary greatly, 
ranging from locating housing to providing transportation to making appointments.  
These interventions are frequently found to be effective, but with little explanation of 
which important components might have been responsible.   In the following section, 
examples of organizational capacity problems in nonprofit community agencies are 
described.  The specific project that required the SOC to be developed is presented. 
1.1.  Problems of agency capacity.   
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is one of many funding organizations using 
nonprofit community agencies extensively as vehicles for conducting demonstrations of 
innovations in social service delivery in the area of health and health care.  Not 
infrequently, agencies implementing demonstrations fail to implement them as planned or 
fail to complete them.  Several foundations have initiated efforts to attempt to reduce the 
number of demonstration failures.  The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation (EMCF), for 
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 example, has initiated an intervention that makes a substantial investment in agency 
information system capacity.  The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) staff 
observed that failures in community agencies seemed related to organizational capacity to 
undertake new or expanded projects.  These agencies are often smaller and younger than 
more established agencies.  The value of using such agencies for demonstrations derives, 
in part, from perceptions that they have closer ties with their constituencies; are service 
innovators; and are more tightly focused, more quickly responsive, and less expensive 
than larger, more established agencies working in the same communities (Leviton, 2001; 
Leviton & Schuh, 1999).  These perceptions have not been verified directly through 
systematic study, but there is indirect evidence that supports some of them.  We know, 
for example, that smaller organizations tend to operate on a more informal basis than 
older or larger organizations and that informal organization systems tend to be more 
flexible and more rapidly responsive than formal ones (Downs, 1967; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1969).  We also know that community organizations frequently emerge in 
response to local problems or events, so they can be expected to have very close ties to 
the community (Light, 2001).   
 
Small agencies sometimes have difficulty in providing the continuity of effort required 
for successful implementation and completion of demonstrations.  Often the problem is 
one of management’s failure to ensure that performance is delivered as expected by the 
funding bodies.  For example, staff turnover is sometimes high in small agencies 
resulting in delays or interruptions in service.  The downside of using community 
organizations for demonstrations has been studied no more systematically than the 
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 upside.  However, nonprofit foundations engaging in demonstration research have been 
interested in "sustainability" and are now beginning to explore "capacity building" as a 
partial response to some of these downside issues.  The Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation, the California Wellness Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation are prominent among those 
foundations exploring organizational capacity building.  Each approaches the problem 
from a slightly different perspective.  For example, the California Wellness Foundation 
focuses on providing technical assistance (TA) and even defines capacity building in 
terms of TA.  The EMC Foundation is experimenting with investing large sums in a few 
organizations over the course of several years to determine if increasing capacity will 
result in better programs or services for children.  The Packard foundation has been 
providing grantees with management consulting and training since 1983, and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) is experimenting with capacity building prior to grant 
making or grant expansion in hopes of improving the success rate when community 
organizations implement demonstration or new programs.  The work reported here 
emanates from the Small Agency Building Initiative (SABI) of the RWJF that began in 
1999.     
 
1.2.   The Small Agency Building Initiative and its evaluation 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation invited me to evaluate its project aimed at 
building small agency capacity.  The RWJF staff perspective is that smaller agencies are 
"...closer to the problems of communities affected by health and social problems than are 
larger more established agencies," and they tend to lack sufficient "organizational 
 5
 capacity" to successfully implement agreed upon projects.  Therefore, the foundation 
wished to study the effects of capacity building grants made in addition to, or prior to, 
demonstration grants, with the hope that such resources might improve the ability of 
community organizations to implement and complete projects.  However, there were 
three problems:  a lack of definition concerning what increased capacity would be, a 
molar (undifferentiated) intervention construct proposed as the demonstration 
intervention, and measures of outcome that were weak at best.  These problems posed 
potentially serious obstacles for successful evaluation of the initiative.   
1.3.  The problem of an under-defined construct, capacity 
The proposed intervention was intended to provide a limited amount of technical 
assistance and infrastructure support to build the capacity of agencies to implement new 
grants.  Capacity was not more specifically defined.  Without a clear definition of 
capacity, it was unclear what the intervention was to accomplish.  The potential problem 
posed for an evaluation is that each organization would receive a different intervention, 
reducing an evaluation to assessing a collection of unique interventions each with a 
sample of one.  The term “capacity” required an “operational definition” of sufficient 
precision that it could be used across the grantee agencies with some degree of 
consistency to assess the extent to which it had been “built” (Blalock, 1972).  As the 
evaluator, I could see that the project would likely produce highly varied results and 
would be difficult to evaluate successfully due to the lack of an adequate operational 
definition of capacity.   
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 1.4.  The problem of a molar or undifferentiated intervention construct 
Molar intervention constructs, like training and technical assistance (T&TA), are likely to 
be varied from organization to organization.  Even if an evaluation detects effects, it will 
be unable to explain the relative contribution of the various elements of the intervention 
makes in producing those effects.  In other words, it is difficult to determine just what an 
undifferentiated demonstration intervention has demonstrated.  Molar intervention 
constructs also make replication of the demonstration difficult to achieve (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  The term “organizational capacity” 
is readily recognized as a molar construct with many interrelated dimensions, as defined 
by Cook and Campbell (1973).  Capacity is a complex, multi-dimensional construct used 
to describe an array of micro-mediators that may or may not contribute to producing 
observed effects at a given time.  Micro-mediators describe cause and effect relationships 
on a level smaller than the molar level.  In the preceding paragraphs, technical assistance, 
information systems, and management might all be thought of as different micro-
mediators of capacity.   Molar constructs can be evaluated, but attribution of observed 
effects to the interventions studied is highly problematic because similar effects may be 
produced in a variety of ways.  Lipsey (1988) recommends developing more complex 
constructs to better represent the complexity of the problems being addressed by 
interventions and to more precisely identify the mediating variables.  Clearly, in the 
absence of pre-existing measures, applying conventional approaches for evaluating the 
SABI was likely to produce unclear or unconvincing results.  
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 1.5.  The problem of anticipating weak outcome measures  
 
Social programs and interventions tend to be weak relative to the problem they purport to 
address (Rutman, 1980; Yeaton, 1985; Yeaton & Sechrest, 1981) and tend to produce 
modest results (small to moderate effects) (Tukey et al., 1976; Reichardt, 1994; Sechrest 
& Yeaton, 1981).  At the same time, evaluations are able to detect only moderate to large 
effects (Crane, 1978; Lipsey et al., 1985; Lipsey, 1990).  This combination is a formula 
for ambiguous or null evaluation results that is frequently overlooked in the planning and 
evaluation of demonstration projects.  Reducing variation in outcomes among sites is one 
way to sensitize an evaluation to the effects produced by a demonstration.  The antithesis 
also holds.  High variability in outcomes introduces noise into the evaluation, making 
detection of intervention effects more difficult. 
 
The planned interventions (technical assistance) were to be small, of short duration, and 
varied to meet the unique needs of each agency, suggesting that the expected outcomes 
themselves would be at best small to moderate and varied by agency. 
   
Reviewing the extensive prior work on organizational capacity revealed no organizing 
framework adequate for assessing the foundation's initiative.  Accordingly, I started to 
work on developing such a framework and was able to identify a number of dimensions 
that contribute to organizational capacity to successfully implement new or expanded 
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 innovations or demonstrations.  When agency development on one or more of these 
dimensions is not adequate for the intervention, successful implementation may be 
problematic.  
Since the initial work on the SABI project, I have focused on the development of a 
maturity model that is called Staging Organizational Capacity (SOC).  It has been 
developed with support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and applied in a 
number of the Foundation’s nonprofit community agency grantees.  It has also been 
applied successfully (i.e., funders and agencies agree with results) in several nonprofit 
agencies in Pittsburgh; Philadelphia; and Silver Spring, Maryland.  This study will 
describe the processes used to develop the validity of the instrument in a variety of 
settings.  The data obtained and the changes in the SOC that were made to improve its 
validity and utility in these settings will be used to document that basis for the features, 
sub-features, and attributes used to describe the stages of development of organizational 
capacity of nonprofit community agencies.  These results will demonstrate the value and 
applicability of the SOC maturity model.  The characteristics of maturity models and the 
features and sub-features of the SOC follow the problem statement.  
1.6.  Problem statement  
The problem statement that identifies what this study investigates is: What is the validity 
of the SOC to identify important characteristics of the capacity of small nonprofit 
organizations?   
The instrument was developed as a maturity model (see next section); therefore, 
assessment of validity addressed the extent to which the maturity model’s features, sub-
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 features, and attributes identify important capacity characteristics.  Validity was tested in 
four ways.  (1) The SOC was compared to the Self Assessment Tool (SAT) of 
organizational capacity, in order to show similarities and differences of the primary 
features of SOC.  (2) The first and last iterations of SOC were compared to provide the 
bases under which the instrument was developed further.  (3) The SOC was tested for 
interrater reliability in various settings by three members of the development team.  (4) 
Documented feedback from primary stakeholders on the accuracy and utility of the SOC 
documented and analyzed.  
 
The data obtained from a wide array of development and initial implementation activities 
were used in the validation study.  These include notes from: (1) the initial Small Agency 
Building Initiative (SABI) experience, (2) iterations of SOC, (3) consultation with 
experts, and (4) stakeholder feedback.  Reliability of three raters indicates that others can 
be trained to use SOC with nonprofit community agencies.  The SOC was developed as a 
maturity model.  A short description of maturity models follows, and the features of 
organizational capacity used in the SOC are listed.   
 
1.6.1. Maturity models 
A maturity model is defined as involving a set of features and a related set of levels or 
stages (Lesgold, 2003; Lesgold, 2000).  A scoring rubric containing attributes of each 
feature for each stage of development is employed as a guide for assessing the stages of 
development of the features at the time of observation.  Five basic features and several 
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 sub features were identified as appropriate for staging organizational capacity (see Figure 
1.1) based on the non-profit and organizational literature. 
 
 
Features of Organizational Capacity  
 
1.  Governance 
 
2.  Financial Resources Maturity 
A.  Financial Vulnerability 
 
3.  Service systems maturity 
A.  Vertical Differentiation 
B.  Horizontal Differentiation 
 
4.  Human Resources Maturity 
A.  Service/Management differentiation 
B.  Service/Management specialization 
 
5.  Internal operations maturity 
A.  Management Information Systems 
B.  Finance and Budgeting Systems 
C.  Human Resource Systems 
D.  Communications Systems 
E.  Development Systems 
 
Figure 1.1  Maturity Model Features for Staging Organizational Capacity 
 
The maturity model is predicated on the assumption that organizational features will 
vary, in part, based on each organization's stage of development from less developed 
capacity to highly developed capacity.  Five developmental stages are defined for this 
model.  These are employed for rating organizations from least developed capacity (Stage 
1) to most highly developed capacity (Stage 5) for attributes of each feature.  Attributes 
for the features and sub-features in Figure 1.1 are identified and studied in a wide variety 
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 of literatures.  The focus of Chapter 2 is to identify the appropriate fields and references 
in which these have been studied and to determine the extent to which there is convincing 
evidence supporting developmental pathways or organizational life cycles for use in 
SOC.   
 
Chapter 2 discusses some more fundamental concepts on which the SOC’s development 
of SOC was based.  The underlying concepts of organizations and of interventions on 
which the SOC was conceptualized are identified.  Some of the important organizational 
concepts are: 
1.  Organizations as open systems,  
2.  Organizational life cycles, 
3.  Organizational capacity, 
4.  Profit and nonprofit organizational differences. 
 
Some characteristics of interventions that can moderate the potential impact of a 
demonstration program or social intervention and the ability to detect the effects of 
programs are: 
1. Intervention strength, 
2.  Dose/response relationships, 
3.  Intervention maturity 
 12
 In Chapter 3 the procedures used to investigate the validity of the SOC are delineated.  
The four primary analyses that were used to focus and structure the study are specified.  
Important issues are identified and some of the most relevant literature to be analyzed and 
synthesized is listed.  This seemingly linear investigational structure is somewhat 
misleading, as many of the concepts arise in a wide range of sources, the meaning of 
which was synthesized for small nonprofits. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study and Chapter 5 concludes by discussing lessons 
learned and the implications for future research. 
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2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Background 
This chapter reviews several literatures that identify organizational characteristics, 
especially those of community agencies,  that affect their ability to implement change.  
These literatures provide the theoretical and empirical basis for the development of the 
Staging Organizational Capacity maturity model.  Although the features and attributes of 
SOC are primarily derived from observation and experience, the research literature 
provides a foundation for the conception of organizational capacity as it is delineated in 
the SOC. 
 
2.1. Organizations and organizational capacity 
 
An attempt to catalog the lessons learned about organizations would exceed the capacity 
of the author and the scope of this effort.  Rather, this section will present that 
organizational literature upon which the innovations in developing the SOC are 
predicated.  Contributions from systems theory, and in particular open systems theory, 
are discussed first, followed by an analysis of evidence that organizations mature through 
cycles or stages.  Next, the construct of organizational capacity is examined, and the final 
topic is differences between profit and nonprofit organizations as they relate to 
organizational capacity.  
 14
  
2.1.1. Organizations as open systems  
  
 
Systems theory provides the basic framework from which organizational capacity was 
approached in developing the SOC.  Some systems theory definitions provide a 
foundation for the SOC logic.  A system is defined as "...a set of objects together with 
relationships between the objects and between their attributes” (Hall & Fagen, 1968).  
Objects are the component parts of a system, and attributes are the properties of objects 
and may be infinite in their variety (Hall & Fagen, 1968).  This definition is not yet 
complete because many "systems" meet these broad criteria without being organizations.  
The solar system and automobile's electrical system are but two from an infinite variety 
of systems both natural and man-made.  Organizations have the further characteristic of 
being human constructions that are, in many ways, isomorphisms of organic systems.  As 
isomorphisms of natural systems, organizations can be studied, appropriately, by 
borrowing conceptually from studies of natural systems.  Hence, we speak of 
organizational behavior and adaptability in biological terms.  Just as organic systems 
exist and function in environments, the concept of “organizational environments” has 
contributed to current understanding of organizational functioning and development.  
Systems environments are defined by Hall and Fagen (1968) as "...a set of all objects a 
change in whose attributes affects the system and also those objects whose attributes are 
changed by the behavior of the system."  These key definitions from systems theory form 
the basic framework for understanding organizations used in this study, which relies 
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 heavily on open systems theory for identification of organizational objects and attributes.  
Katz and Kahn (1966) identified nine characteristics that are shared by open systems: 
1. Importation of energy,  
2. Through-put of energy, 
3. Output of energy, 
4. Cycles of events, 
5. Negative entropy, 
6. Information input and feedback, 
7. Homeostasis, 
8. Differentiation,  
9. Equifinality. 
 
The first three characteristics are well understood.  Organizations survive by importation 
of energy, raw materials or money, from the environment in return for exporting some 
product beneficial to the environment.  The through-put is the internal process by which 
the energy imported is transformed into the product.  The process of importation, 
transformation, and exportation is a cyclic process whereby the outputs provide the 
sources of inputs for the next cycle.  The relationship between funding sources and 
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 grantees or contractors comes easily to mind as an example of this cyclic process for 
those of us in academic settings. 
 
Negative entropy.  Entropy is defined as a universal law of nature "... in which all forms 
of organization move toward disorganization or death" (Katz & Kahn, 1966).  However, 
open systems can overcome the entropic process by importing more energy from the 
environment than is expended.  By storing reserves, organizations can survive crises and 
forestall disorganization or death.  That is, they achieve negative entropy.  Katz and Kahn 
maintain that open social systems, unlike biological systems, can reverse or arrest the 
entropic process almost indefinitely, becoming indefinitely "sustainable.”  
Accomplishing sustainability requires that organizations receive information that signals 
changes in the input-output cycle in order to make adjustments that preserve a steady 
state of energy exchange between the organization and its environment.  Katz and Kahn 
call this steady state “dynamic homeostasis.”  The organization is dynamic in the sense 
that the balance of inputs to outputs is not static, only the ratio  of inputs to outputs is 
steady under homeostasis.    
 
Open systems tend to become more highly differentiated as they mature.  Greater 
differentiation is characterized by the replacement of global functions with more 
specialized functions.  We see differentiation in social service organizations as they 
develop specialized management and service functions as they grow older and larger 
(Blau, 1970).  Katz and Kahn describe a progression during which social organizations 
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 progress from their initial state "... toward the multiplication and elaboration of roles with 
greater specialization of function."  The principle to be extracted from evolutionary 
differentiation is that open systems, in general, and social organizations, in particular, are 
initially "... governed by dynamic interaction of their components; later on fixed 
arrangements and conditions of constraint are established which render the system and its 
parts more efficient...(von Bertalanffy, 1956)."  This progression has led to a body of 
literature describing organizational life cycles and stages of development that are a 
linchpin of the SOC framework.  The subject of the developmental stages of 
organizations is more fully examined below.   
 
A final precept from open systems theory that contributes to the logic of our framework 
is called equifinality (Katz & Kahn, 1966).  The principle of equifinality states that "...a 
system can reach the same final state from differing initial conditions and by a variety of 
paths" (Katz & Kahn, 1966).  A corollary emerging from the principles of differentiation 
and equifinality is that as organizations become more highly differentiated, the amount of 
equifinality decreases.  Smaller, less differentiated organizations can, therefore, be 
expected to display greater variety in their internal and external arrangements than larger, 
more highly differentiated organizations.  The implication for evaluation of the Small 
Agency Building Initiative and development of SOC is that the capacity of larger, more 
established organizations may be easier to compare and contrast than that of less 
differentiated organizations.   
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 2.1.2. Organizational life-cycles  
 
Evidence that organizations start, develop, and end along general pathways has been 
accumulating since just before World War I (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Katz & Kahn, 1966; 
Downs, 1967; Quinn & Cameron, 1983).  Early concepts emerged in neoclassical 
organizational theory and in the structural/functional work of the modern period (Shafritz 
& Ott, 1987).  The body of this early work focuses on larger and more mature 
organizations and on their internal workings.  The perspective tended to be cross-
sectional and static.  This limited perspective has evolved to include studies of the 
dynamics of organizational growth and development, leading to the emergence of 
systems theory.  Applying the precepts of systems theory to the study of organizations 
has resulted in postulates of some general and predictable patterns of organizational 
maturity.  Increasingly, authors are describing characteristics of organizational life cycles 
and stages of organizational maturation (Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Downs, 1967; Katz & 
Kahn, 1966; Light, 1998; Stevens, 1992; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990; Smith et al., 1985; 
Prochaska et al., 2001; Crosby, 1980).  Most postulate a temporal sequence of 
development employing from three to seven stages.  Katz and Kahn (1966), working 
from a systems perspective, described the three stages mentioned above.  Anthony 
Downs (1967), in his study of bureaucracy, also used a three-stage model to describe "the 
life cycle of bureaus."  More recently Quinn and Cameron (1983) studied nine 
organizational life-cycle models representing diverse perspectives.  They concluded that 
there was sufficient evidence of underlying patterns to support a synthesis of the life-
cycle models.  The patterns they cite include: evidence of a sequential developmental 
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 process, evidence that organizational maturation is a hierarchical progression, and 
evidence that the same patterns emerge in a wide range of settings, structures, and 
functions.  Their synthesis produced a four-stage model : 
Stage 1.  "entrepreneurial" stage progressing to a  
Stage 2.  "collectivity" stage, then to a  
Stage 3.  "formalization and control stage," followed by an  
Stage 4.  "elaboration of structure" stage  
 
 
Kazanjian (1988) proposed a "stage-of-growth model" for technology-based firms, 
especially new ventures.  The four stages of this model, which resembles Quinn and 
Cameron's,. are: 
Stage 1.  Conception and Development 
Stage 2.  Commercialization 
Stage 3.  Growth 
Stage 4.  Stability 
 
Kazanjian's model was employed to investigate the degree to which the problems faced 
by firms studied were associated with their stage of growth.  He found "partial" support 
for a model of predicable patterns of growth.  Use of the model was extended to study, in 
105 companies, the relationships by stage of development for decision-making, 
functional specialization, and rate of growth in 105 companies (Kazanjian & Drazin, 
1990).  This study is important, not only for reporting positive findings, but for being one 
of the few empirical studies of stage-state relationships.  A limitation of the study 
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 reported by the authors is noteworthy for the current project, namely that ther model is 
limited to a cross-sectional analysis and did not support a longitudinal analysis as well.   
 
The empirical work in the domain of organizational maturity is largely descriptive and 
exploratory in nature.  The topics addressed range widely, and models of developmental 
stages vary from study to study.  However, most of the stage-growth related 
organizational literature does not describe empirical research but, rather, is prescriptive or 
explanatory in nature.  Fletcher and Taplin (1999) employ a six-stage maturity model to 
provide leadership guidance to managers in a "food-for-thought" genre book in which 
management styles and techniques are asserted to be related to an organization's 
evolutionary stage.    Crosby (1980) employs a five-stage maturity model for measuring 
"quality management."  This is a "how-to-do-it-yourself" genre work for assessing the 
stage of development of "quality management."  No claim is made that the resulting 
measures have specific meaning.  However, the authors do assert that the instrument can 
be used to compare companies or divisions.  Simon and Donovan (2001) employ a five 
stage maturity model for use by nonprofits in assessing the stage of development of their 
organizations.  This is also a "do-it-yourself" genre work that, in my experience, appears 
to be somewhat better grounded than many works of its kind.  Five stages are assessed 
along seven organizational features like governance and leadership.  A scoring rubric is 
provided for those using the instrument to rate 15 items for each feature on a five point 
Likert scale ranging from "least like us" to "most like us."  This work shares more in 
appearance with the SOC approach than any other model or instrument reviewed.  The 
similarities and differences will be discussed later in the section on evaluation.  
 21
 2.1.3. Organization capacity and capacity-building as molar constructs  
 
Capacity-building is a term that has become commonplace in the evaluation world.  
Funding bodies want to implement and evaluate capacity-building in community, 
organizational, family, and individual settings (Scheirer & Thayer, 2000; Wilder 
Foundation, 2000; the California Wellness Foundation, 2001; Letts et al., 1999).  The 
term capacity-building is variably defined as illustrated by the following citations from 
the literature:   
  Capacity building is "...enhancing the ability of individuals and groups to mobilize 
and develop resources, skills and committments needed to accomplish shared goals." 
(The Wilder Foundation, 2000). 
 
  "Capacity building is the development of an organization's core skills and capabilities, 
such as leadership, management, finance, and fundraising, programs and evaluation, in 
order to build the organization's effectiveness and sustainability." (California Wellness 
Foundation, 2001).   
 
  "And by 'capacity-building' we mean building the capacity to fulfill an organization's 
mission." (Jacobs, 2001). 
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   “Capacity building can be defined as structural changes in an organization like the 
addition or re-allocation of staff, the alteration or creation of an MIS, or the use of 
consultants” (Vinzant & Vinzant, 1996). 
 
  “Building [evaluation] capacity is thus the enterprise of raising the_collective_ability 
to perform a certain level of evaluation tasks ...." (Stevenson et al., 2000).  
 
Organizational capacity is not usually considered in the abstract.  Letts et al. (1999) talk 
about program delivery capacity, program expansion capacity, and adaptive capacity.  
Harrison (1987) discusses organizational capacity to implement change.   Fredericksen 
and London (2000) discuss organizational capacity to administer projects.  Stevenson et 
al. (2000) discuss the evaluation capacity of organizations.  As can be seen, the term 
capacity in reference to organization capacity or capacity building is a molecular 
construct comprising elements that vary both in kind and number depending on use.  
 
Many foundations use the term capacity or capacity-building to describe either 
"sustainability" of an organization or an intervention for the term of a grant, or for the 
period after which grant funds are no longer available.  The term capacity building is 
used frequently to describe efforts intended to improve sustainability of either 
organizations or specific demonstrations.  Strategic planning, fund raising, or 
communications are believed to be some of the mechanisms to achieve this improvement, 
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 and capacity building interventions tend to target increasing or improving staff skills in 
these domains. Technical assistance (TA) of some form is the vehicle for delivering the 
interventions, usually on staff skills (California Wellness Foundaton, 2001; The Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, 2000).  TA has been defined as "... an individualized 
educational program." (Reifler, 2000).  
 
My experience is that limiting capacity building interventions to TA obscures vital 
dimensions of the construct of capacity like the collective abilities noted by Scriven and 
the structural resources noted by Vinzant and Vinzant {1996).  Therefore, I construe 
capacity as comprised of both organizational resources and individual skills.  Individual 
skills and experience consist of the human capital assets of an agency and are an indicator 
of how well an agency can perform.  Organizational resources include the structures, 
systems, and resources of an agency.  Organizational resources influence how individuals 
within an agency can work.  Agency productivity is a function of the skills and 
experience of employees plus those resources that organizations bring to bear permitting 
individuals to function at various levels of skill and expertise (Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 
1999).   Highly productive agencies will have organizational resources and arrangements 
sufficient to permit employees and volunteers to be assigned to tasks requiring their 
greatest skills.  Less productive agencies may have people working on tasks that do not 
require their best skills or they may have people assigned to tasks for which their skills 
are less than ideally suited.    
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 2.1.4. Differences between profit and nonprofit organizations 
 
A debate about the similarities and differences between managing and operating profit 
making organizations and nonprofit service organizations has been taking place for many 
years (Zaltman, 1979; Letts, et al., 1999).  Currently in vogue are a host of private sector 
management practices touted as improving nonprofit performance.  Many consultants and 
policy makers assert that applying private sector practices that to contribute to success in 
business would improve nonprofit organization productivity and sustainability.  I have 
been unable to find research that supports such assertions.  However, there is evidence 
suggesting that such mimetic isomorphism is as likely to introduce dysfunction as it is 
function (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Indeed, a variety of profit-world practices have 
been attempted in the nonprofit environment with highly mixed results and most have 
only limited periods of popularity.  Some of the practices tried in nonprofit settings and 
found to be flawed or of limited value include Total Quality Management (TQM) (Senge, 
1990), strategic planning (Light, 1998; Hamel & Prahalad, 1989; Mintzberg, 1994), and 
an array of performance measurement practices (Perrin, 1998).  Repeated failure to 
replicate profit world-results in nonprofit environments suggests the existence of some 
important differences between the two types of organization that might be fundamental.  
Three of these differences contribute to the underlying logic of this effort.   
 
First, nonprofits differ from profit sector enterprises in that their end is not to generate 
profits or monetary surpluses.  Profit-making organizations develop a product or service 
first and then bring it to market.  The infrastructure necessary to raise capital and develop 
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 the organization's product and bring it to market must exist first.  Non-profit 
organizations, on the other hand, frequently come into being to provide services for 
which there is already a market.  The consequence is that nonprofits, especially smaller 
ones, are apt to lack the infrastructure and resources to optimally manage their projects.  
In fact, non-profits are characterized as being part of a culture that eschews developing 
the infrastructure necessary to become highly productive (Letts, 1999).  Policy makers, 
funding sources, and even service recipients tend to view infrastructure development as 
diverting limited resources from services.  In my experience, nonprofit organizations are 
frequently told, by policy or regulation, how much they may charge for the services they 
provide, with little or no consideration for the actual costs incurred.  They are frequently 
also told how their income must be spent.  For example, foundations frequently proclaim 
a maximum allowance for overhead or indirect expenditures. The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation (2001), for example, limited overhead to nine per cent of direct costs without 
consideration of agency size or age.  While this practice is consistent with the nonprofit 
culture described by Letts and company, it may constitute an unintended penalty for 
smaller organizations.  In working with community-based organizations, I have observed 
that well differentiated smaller agencies tend to have higher overhead requirements as a 
proportion of total revenues than do larger organizations, and that recovery of overhead 
costs is a general problem of smaller organizations (Schuh, Leviton, & Stagg, 2000).  The 
problem of inadequate recovery of overhead can be exacerbated when managerial 
requirements are imposed without adequate consideration of the increased burden.  For 
example a Philadelphia-based foundation funded a multi-organization initiative at modest 
levels to implement activities intended to reduce or prevent violence.  After agencies 
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 were funded, a new responsibility to participate in an initiative-wide management 
information reporting system was mandated.  However, additional resources to support 
participation were not provided, and agencies consistently reported to this evaluator that 
the additional burden detracted considerably from their ability to implement activities as 
originally planned.   
 
The requirement or expectation that agencies develop a strategic plan without 
consideration of the infrastructure requirements necessary to support such planning is 
another example of a common mandate on small organizations without provision for 
meeting the overhead expenses incurred.  Vinzant and Vinzant (1996) assert that 
successful implementation of strategic management practices is related to the resources 
and the degree of autonomy organizations possess in implementing change.  
Organizations without adequate infrastructure are not likely to benefit from strategic 
management.  Limited organizational autonomy constrains implementation of strategic 
management processes.  And as the number of constraints increases, the usefulness of 
strategic management diminishes.  The view of these authors is that strategic 
management practices are less appropriate for smaller organizations supported by grants 
or contracts to provide services over which they have only limited power to change or 
alter.  Most of the small agencies that I have visited in the past three years indicate that 
they have a strategic plan, and most report that the exercise of developing the plan was a 
good exercise.  But they also report that the plan has not been followed, is out-dated, or 
has been shelved in order to attend to issues not covered in their plan.  Yet strategic 
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 planning is a basic technical assistance offering to small agencies with little assessment 
of their capacity to implement and reap the benefits of strategic management. 
 
Second, profit making organizations develop a product and enter the market place to 
compete for returns on their investment.  Nonprofits, on the other hand, are frequently 
required to respond to a policy initiative or meet the needs of a target population without 
a prior investment in product (intervention) development.  Instead, development takes 
place concurrently with implementation of the intervention.  The mechanism of going to 
market with an undeveloped or incomplete intervention is part of the problem addressed 
by Scriven's (1967) distinction between formative and summative evaluation, which was 
predicated on a perception that interventions are frequently evaluated prior to being 
developed for optimal performance.  The concept of evaluability assessment (Horst et al., 
1974; Wholley, 1976,1987,1994; Rutman, 1980) supported and extended Scriven's 
observation to include social program implementation in general.  Evaluability 
assessment recognizes that programs need to mature to a point of intervention stability 
before they are able to support an evaluation.  The ongoing need for formative evaluation 
and for evaluability assessments, however, is an indication that, unlike profit making 
organizations, nonprofit organizations seldom have the luxury of developing an optimal 
product before it is brought to market and judged by those funding it.   
 
Third, performance measurement and strategic management are of more practical value 
when used with profit-making organizations than with nonprofits.  A reason for this 
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 difference relates to the nature of the products.  Profit making ventures can relate their 
income directly to their output and assess the degree to which they meet expectations.  
For example, McDonald's or Wendy's can count the products they sell and the return 
derived.  Nonprofits, on the other hand, are engaged in providing services.  Their output 
is essentially measured in terms of the activities completed in providing services, 
frequently on a fee-for-service basis.  Activity data are inherently flawed.  Activity data 
tend to inflate over time (Blau, 1963) and to become distorted as they are reported 
(Downs, 1967), making activity measures poor candidates for assessing agency 
effectiveness, in general (Perrin, 1998).   
 
Summary.  Organizations can be characterized meaningfully as open systems existing in 
an environment from which they must exchange energy in order to survive.  
Organizations can be viewed as maturing by passing through developmental stages of 
growth that are generally sequential in nature.  Organizations exhibit similar structural 
and functional characteristics at a given stage of development.  There is no general 
agreement on the number of stages appropriate for studying organizational maturation.  
However, three, four, and five-stage models are most prevalent.  
 
The concept of organizational capacity is a molar construct that can comprise a highly 
variable number and type of elements.  Capacity includes both individual and 
organizational attributes.  Individual attributes include the combined potentials (skills, 
knowledge, and experiences) that those working in an organization bring to their jobs.  
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 Organizational attributes include the resources (structures and technologies) that 
condition how individuals are able to apply their skills and experiences to their work.  
 
Finally, this section presented some evidence of differences between profit and nonprofit 
organizations that might make the application of management practices considered 
effective in the profit world irrelevant when applied to nonprofit organizations.  
Nonprofits tend to have underdeveloped or sparse management infrastructures compared 
to profit-making ventures.  The relative lack of structural arrangements has the effect of 
limiting the comparative adaptability of community organizations.  Social service 
organizations do not have the same autonomy as profit-making organizations.  They are 
more directly regulated in what they may charge for their services and even how they 
deliver these services.  It has been shown that, as autonomy decreases, the value of 
strategic management decreases (Vinzant & Vinzant, 1996).  In general then, strategic 
planning may be less appropriate for the nonprofit world than for the profit-world.  
Typically, the productivity of social service organizations is measured in terms of 
activities.  We know that activity data have the inherent flaw of inflation and distortion 
through time.  This flaw limits the utility of using profit world management techniques 
like TQM and performance measurement in much of the nonprofit sector. 
 
In this section we have considered lessons from the literature on organizations because 
they are the targets of capacity-building interventions intended to change or improve 
them.  Successful evaluation of the effects of such interventions requires an 
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 understanding of the nature of intervention factors that can influence success or failure to 
either produce or detect the intended change.  The next section turns to a consideration of 
assumptions about interventions that have contributed to the rationale for developing the 
SOC.   
2.2. Interventions  
In this section aspects of social interventions are discussed from three perspectives; (a) 
social interventions as delivered by social service, educational, and treatment 
organizations, (b) the role of demonstrations as subset of (a), and (c) interventions 
intended to produce changes in organizations or organizational capacity.   
 
2.2.1.  Social intervention 
Social intervention, as used here, is synonymous with social programs as defined by 
Weiss (1972), includes treatments as intended by Lipsey (1990) in discussing treatment 
effectiveness research, and also includes programs, projects, and elements as defined by 
Cook, Leviton, and Shadish (1985).  Two attributes of interventions will be examined: 
the tendency for interventions to be weak, and evidence that they pass through 
developmental stages.   
1. Intervention strength.  In general, social interventions are not of sufficient strength to 
accomplish their intended purpose.  The clearest statement of the fundamental problem 
was made by Charles Reichardt (1994) when he wrote:  
 For the most part, our social programs are not solving the problems to which they are 
addressed.  One of the major reasons for these failures is that social programs tend to be 
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 puny and poorly developed.  By puny, I mean the resources devoted to social programs 
are small relative to the size of the problem.  By poorly developed, I mean relatively little 
effort goes into the program's conceptual planning and design.   
 
This provocative statement reinforces a similarly provocative  observation by Rutman 
(1980) a decade earlier that: 
 The causal assumptions linking a program to some of its goals are often weak.  In these 
instances the program represents a puny response to complex and long-standing 
problems. 
 
Intervention weakness or strength is defined as a function of the relationship between the 
amount of resources devoted to addressing a problem and the size of the problem itself.  
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a comparison of the complexity of the problem with 
the complexity of the intervention addressing it.   
 
Comparing intervention resources to the magnitude of the problem can become a multi-
level undertaking.  On an individual level, the resources available may or may not be 
sufficient for those being served.  For example, some HMOs place a limit on the number 
of psychiatric visits to which patients are entitled.  That limit is frequently on the order of 
28 to 30 visits either per year or per lifetime depending on the HMO.  On the average, 
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 this arbitrary number might be adequate, meaning for half of those in need it is likely to 
be inadequate.  Interventions to treat anxiety or depression might be more successful 
within a 30-visit limitation than will those aimed at treating the homeless who have 
mental health or substance use problems.   
 
A second example at the organization level is the Partner's Project, designed to treat 
mothers in recovery from substance abuse and their prenatally exposed children.  A major 
component of that project was supervised sheltered housing.  The project always had a 
waiting list of potential clients because of the limited number of apartments available to 
the program.  This project, successful on an individual level, was inadequate to address 
the magnitude of the problem in its community, with a waiting list months long.   
 
References addressing intervention strength are slowly emerging in the evaluation 
literature under the leadership of Lee Sechrest (1979).  Employing a medical analogy, 
Sechrest introduced the concept of intervention dosage, noting that if the dose was not 
strong enough for the seriousness of the problem, the treatment was not likely to be 
successful.  Yeaton and Sechrest (1981) observed that treatment strength is a function of 
both the planned intervention and the integrity with which it is administered.  Sechrest 
and Yeaton define treatment strength as "...the a priori likelihood that a treatment would 
have it intended effect." (Yeaton, 1985).  Variation in intervention strength can be related 
to differences in intensity (Reicken, 1976), duration (Weiss, 1972), or rate of decay 
(Lipsey, 1990).  As of this writing, no more meaningful synthesis of intervention strength 
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 has emerged.  However, interventions of a given strength are not likely to have a uniform 
effect on individuals, organizations, or communities.  Readiness or capacity of a target to 
benefit from a given intervention can be expected to vary in two important ways.  First, 
individual differences in response to an given intervention can be expected.  Termed the 
dose/response relationship, this is a public health/medical concept that is increasingly 
being applied to social interventions (Yeaton & Sechrest, 1981; Lipsey, 1990; Hermann, 
1998).  Second, stage appropriate interventions have been found to be more successful 
than more general and stage inappropriate interventions (Prochaska & DiClemente, 
1992).   
2.  Dose\Response relationships.  A positive relationship has been reported between the 
amount of treatment and the amount of resulting benefit (Howard, et al., 1986; Yeaton & 
Sechrest, 1981; Lipsey, et al., 1985; Test, 1981).  Generally speaking, stronger 
interventions are more successful and weaker interventions are less successful.  Sechrest 
et al. (1981) cite three potential reasons for weak treatment effects: Weak interventions 
(treatments), interventions inappropriate for conditions, and weak dosage of a potentially 
strong intervention.  Prescriptions for improving intervention results generally focus on 
strengthening the dose as a means for strengthening results.   
 
When dosage is not appropriate for the seriousness of the problem in a given 
intervention, the treatment, predictably, is not likely to induce the intended response.  
Increasing the treatment might produce a better response if the increase is tailored to the 
individual response.  There is evidence that more flexible approaches might improve the 
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 success of interventions.  For example, reports from community support programs have 
established that comprehensive programs to provide community care for the mentally ill 
are more successful than less comprehensive ones.  The Community Support Program 
(CSP) has been one of the most extensively researched social programs, and findings 
supporting the efficacy of comprehensive approaches have been replicated.  However, the 
reasons for the result have not been reported or even fully understood.  My experience in 
evaluating case management systems leads me to believe that the reason may be related 
to comprehensive programs possessing the flexibility to tailor intervention strength for 
each client.  We had a similar experience with the Integrated Learning Project in which 
we provided enhanced support for Welfare to Work (WtW) mothers identified as having 
mental health problems.  By providing short-term support and additional tutoring, the 
drop out rate from training was reduced by nearly 50%.   
 
The dose part of the dose/response relationship has been the focus to this point.  Dosage 
is a function of the intervention and those administering it.  Now let us turn to a brief 
consideration of the response part of the relationship. 
 
The intended targets of an intervention may vary in their response to interventions of 
similar strength.  Individuals or organizations vary in their readiness to change.  Those 
more amenable to the intervention may require less to produce the desired outcome while 
those less amenable may require more (Schuh & Leviton,1999).  However, most 
government or foundation sponsored social programs tend to come in a one-size-fits-all 
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 package, with the object of serving greater numbers at the expense of accounting for 
individual differences (Yeaton & Sechrest, 1981).  The obvious pitfall to the normal 
approach is that only those whose profile approaches the median are likely to be best 
served, while any on the extremes are likely to be less well served (Schuh & Leviton, 
1999).  Individuals requiring more or stronger intervention than that delivered can be 
expected to be little changed while resources may well be wasted on those requiring less 
than delivered to produce the intended effect.  
Social interventions are intended to produce some change or improvement in people, 
institutions, or communities (Weiss, 1972).  Intervention design and delivery, as 
discussed above, relates to the agents of change.  Adequate intervention design and 
delivery are necessary but insufficient conditions for successful change.  Readiness for 
change on the part of the target of change also conditions the likelihood that interventions 
will succeed or fail.  The best interventions are unlikely to produce the expected results in 
noncompliant recipients.  Targets of interventions can be expected to vary in their 
readiness to change.  Evidence that change and readiness for change occur in stages has 
been accumulating for the past decade.  Prochaska, DiClemente, and Norcross (1992) 
developed their "transtheoretical model" to assess readiness of clients to overcome 
addiction.  They developed Stages of Change assessment and, after a decade of use and 
associated research, concluded that experience supported their readiness for change 
stages and that stage-appropriate interventions are more effective than are more general 
addiction treatment interventions.  Evidence supporting effectiveness of stage-tailored 
interventions exists in other areas as well.  Welfare-to-Work interventions report better 
training program completion rates through use of profiling techniques to identify 
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 participant stage of readiness to work and targeting intervention resources appropriately 
(Ebert, 1997).  Organizational structures, activities, and criteria of effectiveness vary by 
stage of maturation with the implication that interventions appropriate for one stage 
might not be appropriate for other stages (Quinn & Cameron, 1983).  Vinzant and 
Vinzant (1996) assert that the chances of successfully implementing strategic planning 
are improved by ensuring that the management approach is appropriate for the 
developmental stage of organizational capacity.  A study by Kazanjian and Drazin (1990) 
gave support to the superiority of stage-contingent variables over organizational variables 
in studying issues of organizational structure and process.  This evidence suggests that 
stage-appropriate interventions tend to be stronger and more successful than are more 
general, or one-size-fits-all, intervention designs.   
 
The dose/response social intervention literature emerged from clinical interventions and 
has been highly concentrated on individual level responses (Sechrest et al., 1981).  
However, the literature does appear to justify expanding the concept to include 
interventions targeting organizations and communities.  In fact, DiClemente and 
Prochaska's stages of change model for addiction is now being adapted for use with 
organizational change interventions (Prochaska, Prochaska, & Levesque, 2001).   
 
It is widely acknowledged that social interventions tend to produce only modest results or 
effects (Rutman, 1980; Tukey, 1976; Reichardt, 1994).  And it is evident that stronger 
doses of intervention have the potential for producing greater responses.  Therefore, it is 
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 perplexing that interventions do not discuss dose/response relationships more frequently 
and directly in their planning and evaluation reports. 
 
3.  Intervention maturity.  Interventions have a developmental aspect, and their stage of 
development has implications for their effectiveness.  Scriven alluded to this 
developmental nature when he distinguished formative from summative evaluation.  
Formative evaluation is used to optimize or perfect the evaluand while summative 
evaluation is used to judge effectiveness (Scriven, 1967).  In making this distinction, 
Scriven recognizes that interventions are not born fully mature and are likely to have their 
greatest effects only after a period of development.  Scriven's emphasis was on product 
development (Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 1991) and so formative evaluation addressed, in 
part, issues of intervention design.  The mechanisms for delivering interventions can also 
influence intervention success (Scheirer, 1987).  Interventions sometimes need start-up 
time in order make staffing arrangements or infrastructure adjustments before becoming 
fully implemented; and until full implementation is achieved, an evaluation is not likely 
to find the intended or planned results.  Clearly, better developed and implemented 
interventions are more likely to produce the planned results than less mature 
interventions.     
 
2.2.2. Demonstration programs.   
Demonstrations or demonstration programs are a special category of social intervention 
concerned with new ideas or innovations that might improve existing practice.  Two 
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 important attributes of demonstrations have influenced the development of the SOC: first, 
social demonstrations are intrinsically linked to evaluation research; and second, 
successful demonstrations have a temporal order of development and that order has 
implications both for intervention implementation and for evaluation research methods.  
 
That demonstrations contain an exploratory or knowledge-seeking element can be 
inferred from the definition of demonstration.  Demonstrations are undertaken to show 
that something works or is practical.  Some demonstrations are undertaken to compare 
innovations to accepted or current practice.  Without the aspect of showing or learning 
how something works a demonstration is not a demonstration.  As Suchman (1970) put it, 
"a demonstration without evaluation is not a demonstration."  
 
Stages of demonstration program development were first described by Edward Suchman 
(1970), who differentiated demonstration programs by varying purpose into pilots, 
models, and prototypes to which Weiss (1972) added an institutional stage to 
accommodate demonstration programs that become operational programs.  The literature 
presents evidence to support inclusion of a fifth stage, an exploratory stage.  Therefore, a 
five stage model of demonstration program or project maturity is described here.  
 
                Stage 1        Stage 2      Stage 3      Stage 4       Stage 5
             Exploratory      Pilot         Model       Prototype    Institutional 
Figure 2.1 Demonstration Research Maturation Model 
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The exploratory stage of a demonstration has been described most directly by Tukey.  On 
the importance of exploratory work to social science, he observed in his book on 
exploratory data analysis (1977), "It is important to understand what you CAN DO before 
you learn to measure how WELL you seem to have DONE it."  
 
At a conference convened to examine the state of evaluation research, Tukey prefaced a 
presentation on social experiments by pointing out that social experiments represented 
studies confirming pre-experimental exploratory and pilot work (1976).  He observed that 
the pre-experimental work necessary to support a successful social experiment takes 
longer and is more difficult and more expensive to complete than are studies confirming 
the findings of such work.  This exploratory work emerges from practice and represents 
the insights, observations, and hunches of those working in a field about innovations that 
might improve results.  The objective at this stage is to develop innovations in a form that 
can be piloted.  The Integrated Learning Project (ILP) provides an example of an 
exploratory stage.  The project was intended to provide supplemental adult literacy 
training to WtW participants enrolled in vocational training.  We knew that many of our 
client population were likely to have mental health or substance abuse issues that could 
influence the expected outcomes.  We, therefore, established an informal process of 
identifying those who might have such problems and providing them with additional 
intervention support with the result of improving the trainee completion rate (Schuh et 
al., 1999).  This exploratory work led us to seek a more formal pilot for identifying WtW 
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 participants with mental health and substance abuse issues for whom more intensive short 
term intervention would be appropriate.  
 
The pilot stage is described by Suchman (1970) as a trial and error stage, during which 
innovations can be tried out and perfected.  At this stage issues like the dose\response 
relationships of interventions are explored.  This is also the stage at which the particulars 
of implementation should be reconciled with the intent of the innovation.  The object of a 
pilot stage is to develop a stable model intervention that can be tested.  The ILP example 
above provides an illustration of a pilot emerging from exploratory work.  A more formal 
assessment and short-term intervention was piloted with a second cohort of WtW 
trainees.  For the pilot, a senior clinician with extensive experience in assessing and 
treating clients with mental health and substance use was employed to provide more 
accurate identification of potential problems and more appropriate intervention or referral 
for services.  Lessons from the pilot were employed in developing a model for testing.  
For example, we learned that assessment and intervention worked best when participants 
did not need to leave the training site for them.  We learned that many WtW mothers 
could benefit from an intervention aimed at helping them make a transition to a new set 
of expectations and discipline necessary to complete work training.  These lessons were 
combined to develop a model for testing. 
 
The model stage emerges from a pilot or series of pilots and has as its object validating an 
approach or confirming insights gained from pilots.  This is the confirmatory process 
described by Tukey (1976).  Work at this stage seeks to determine whether the model can 
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 be generalized beyond the pilot experience.  Using more controlled conditions than 
possible or appropriate for pilot work, model testing determines the extent to which pilot 
results are confirmed.  This is the stage at which the rigor of experimental methods is 
most important and most appropriate (Suchman, 1970; Weiss, 1972, 2001).  In fact, 
Weiss (1972) asserts that this is the only stage of demonstration maturity at which 
experimental methods are necessary, being premature and, therefore, inappropriate for 
the prior stages and unnecessary for the following stages.  This assertion will be revisited 
in greater detail in the discussion of evaluation issues in the next section.  
 
Successful model tests require interventions that are stable and implemented as designed.  
Failure to achieve intervention stability indicates insufficient formative work necessary to 
support an experiment during the exploratory and pilot stages (Schuh, 1998)  
 
If the model intervention is successful under controlled conditions, the next step is to 
implement prototypes of the model under less controlled conditions to see whether it 
produces the intended results under real-world conditions.  During this prototype stage 
implementation may take place at several locations or under more varied conditions.  The 
object is to determine the practicality of broader implementation or to explore conditions 
necessary for success in the broader context. 
 
Successful prototypes can be expected to be developed into operational programs or 
"institutionalized" as a matter of policy.  The institutional stage can be reached by 
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 interventions becoming identifiable programs or through their integration as components 
or options to existing operational programs.  
 
Suchman's model of stages of development for demonstration projects bears a striking 
resemblance to the developmental stages of a medical clinical trial lending it a degree of 
credibility (Evans & Ilstad, 2001).  That similarity has not gone unnoticed as social 
interventions with medical patients have been evaluated and reported as "clinical trials" 
(Wallance & Liberman, 1985).  A clinical trial analogy has aslo been employed for 
describing evaluation of other social programs (Passell, 1993) and it appears to be a 
useful construct for understanding many of the issues relating to successful 
demonstration projects or programs.  
 
2.3. Evaluation  
Aspects of organizations that might influence organizational development interventions 
were examined in Section 2.1. Organizations, in this case, are the target of innovation.  
Issues relating to social interventions (treatments) as they influence outcomes were 
examined above in Section 2.2.  This section presents issues pertaining to the role of 
evaluation (analogous to diagnosis or examination) as they relate to the determination of 
success of demonstrations or innovations.  Evaluation concerns that provide a foundation 
for the need to develop the SOC include:  
 
1.  Many evaluators believe that their craft is perceived as ineffective. 
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 2.  Evaluation methods and measures employed can mean as much to the perceived 
success of a demonstration or innovation as the innovation itself. 
3.  Evaluation of projects in the formative stage must be highly sensitive to subtle change. 
A discussion of these issues follows. 
 
2.3.1. The failure of evaluation to document success 
 
It is widely perceived that evaluation or applied social science is relatively ineffective in 
assessing intervention outcomes (Donaldson, 2001; Lipsey, 1985; Boruch & Wortman, 
1979; Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  As a result, many evaluators conclude that there is 
little evidence that social interventions produced the intended results.  Social innovations 
tend to produce small or moderate effects for many of the reasons discussed earlier.  
Evaluations of social innovations, on the other hand, tend to detect effects only when they 
are moderate to large.  The mismatch between the size of the effects typically produced 
by interventions and the sensitivity of our tools for measuring or detecting those effects 
contributes considerably to the failure of many evaluations to demonstrate program 
success (Lipsey, 1990; Reichardt, 1994; Tukey, 1976).   
 
2.3.2. Contribution of evaluation to successful assessment of innovations 
 
Clearly, since the case is that demonstrations or innovations can be expected to produce 
small to moderate results and evaluation can only detect moderate to large effects, the 
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 prospect looms large that evaluation will fail to detect many positive intervention effects.  
The prospect of not providing a fair test of social interventions ought to be of grave 
concern to those who implement or evaluate them.  All too often, I have heard program 
staff, when confronted with a null evaluation, say that they "could not prove it, but they 
knew that they were having positive results."  Although such may not always be the case, 
the question becomes, "What is the likelihood that well intended evaluations will fail to 
detect positive intervention effects?"  The answer can be inferred from some work of 
Mark Lipsey (1997), who studied the role of methods in outcome evaluation.  He found 
that the evaluation factors (methods and sampling error) were twice as likely to 
contribute to variations in observed effects as were the interventions themselves.  
Evaluation methods alone accounted for about the same variation in effects as the 
interventions themselves.  His studies were based on meta-analyses of hundreds of 
evaluations, but true to his own advice to evaluators, he employed multiple lines of 
evidence (Lipsey, 1981) and found similar patterns for studies of more than one 
intervention area.  Lipsey found a third source of variation in effects attributable to issues 
of measurement contributing nearly as much variation as either the intervention or 
evaluation methods.  One might reasonably conclude that evaluation issues contribute 
more to the findings of success or failure of many innovations as the innovations 
themselves.  The conservative lesson to be derived is that improving evaluation results 
requires at least equal attention to evaluation design, methods, and implementation as to 
intervention design, methods, and implementation and the characteristics of the 
implementing agency. 
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 2.3.3. Evaluation of formative projects must be sensitive to subtle changes 
 
Since social interventions can be expected to produce modest to small effects and since 
evaluations can be expected to detect only modest to large effects, the burden increases 
with formative projects.  Scriven (1967) coined the term formative evaluation to describe 
situations in which the projects or interventions were still undergoing development.  He 
pointed out that such interventions were not producing optimally, and so the program of 
intervention effects might be even smaller than those planned.  One burden for evaluation 
of formative projects is simply to be able to detect that a change has been produced 
regardless of the statistical significance (Lipsey, et al. 1985).  Recognition of this 
evaluation burden has been recurring in the literature for much of the last 50 years 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Suchman, 1967, Scriven,1967; Sechrest & Yeaton, 
1981;Lipsey, et al., 1985).  Among the recommendations for increasing the sensitivity of 
of formative evaluation are (1) increase the power of evaluation to detect effects (Crane, 
1978; Lipsey, 1990), (2) increase exploratory work before designing evaluation (Rutman, 
1980; Tukey, et al.,1979;. Leinhardt & Leinhardt, 1980), and (3) use of observational 
techniques (Cooley, 1978; Concato & Horwith, 2000).    
In the next chapter the procedures used to investigate the theoretical and empirical bases 
for the features, sub-features, and attributes fo SOC are delineated.   How the maturity 
model arose from previous stage models and organizational life cycles will also be 
investigated.   
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3.  METHOD 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the validity of a maturity model for staging the 
organizational capacity of nonprofit community organizations to implement or sustain 
social interventions or demonstration programs.  The problem of this study is to 
investigate the validity of the SOC maturity model and the specific attributes indicative 
of stages of development of nonprofit community agencies.   Evidence supporting the 
validity of SOC has been accumulating from several sources, including the exploratory 
development process of SOC; feedback from evaluators, agency staff, and RWJF staff; 
and application of SOC in the field.   The study of this evidence is organized around four 
analyses:  (a) content validation by comparison of an early version of  new instrument 
with existing instruments assessing capacity to determine the extent to which it assesses 
important dimensions of organizational capacity as conventially viewed, (b) construct 
validation by comparison of an early version of the model with a later version to assess 
its evolution, (c) estimates of interrater reliability among three raters, and (d) construct 
validation through feedback from agency staff and governing board members and from 
staff involved in funding those agencies. 
One of several techniques is frequently used for investigating the validity of new 
instruments.  Four kinds of validity studies have persisted for the past half-century; 
content validity, criterion-related validity, construct validity, and face validity (Mosier, 
1947; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Huck, 2004).  None of these was found to be ideally 
suited or entirely appropriate for estimating the validity of the SOC owing to its unique 
 47
 nature as a maturity model using observational methods and still in formative stages of 
development.  With no single ideal method available, a mixed methods approach was 
employed to determine the extent to which the results converged to establish the validity 
of the SOC in accordance with Lipsey and colleagues that when any one line of evidence 
is likely to be flawed, a convergence of several lines of evidence are more convincing 
than any single one (Lipsey, et al., 1981).  The study of SOC validity will comprise 
evidence from four sources: (a) the initial development of the central features of 
organizational capacity and the maturity model (content validity), (b) an analysis of the 
revisions of the initial SOC based on field trials in SABI grantees and in nonprofit 
community agencies in Pittsburgh (construct validity), and (c) initial assessment of 
interrater reliability among the three SOC project staff (reliability), and (d) feedback from 
RWJF staff and agency officials (construct and face validity).   These are described in 
greater detail below.  
3.1.  Data sources 
Development of the SOC has been an ongoing process for the past three years, during 
which extensive records on the process have been maintained.  The data fall into four 
categories; (1) notes from the Small Agency Building Initiative (SABI) startup, (2) 
various iterations of the SOC during its development, (3) consultation with evaluators 
having expertise in community and organizational capacity building, and (4) feedback 
from agency and foundation stakeholders as the SOC has been applied.  The relevance of, 
and contribution of, these sources of data to the validation of the SOC are described in 
greater detail below.  
1. Small Agency Building Initiative notes.   As indicated in Chapter 1, the SABI project 
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 was an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation concerned with building the 
capacity of small nonprofit community agencies that were grantees or potential 
grantees.  The project began in 1999, and I was involved from the outset in the role of 
evaluation consultant and, later, as evaluator.  During the first year of the project, SABI 
and RWJF were in frequent contact by phone, email, and meetings as we worked to 
operationalize the intent of the initiative.  During the first 18 months, the author (1) 
maintained notebooks on conversations and a record of correspondence and material, 
(2) prepared several reports for the foundation outlining project issues and progress, 
and (3) kept extensive field notes of visits to nonprofit organization SABI grantees.  
These data sources record the initial thinking behind the SOC and document the 
instrument’s origins.    
2. Iterations of SOC.  The SOC has morphed through no fewer than six major iterations 
and several minor revisions of each iteration since the first draft.  Together, they 
constitute a developmental record of the evolution of the instrument, with the first few 
drafts representing my initial thinking combined with that of several RWJF staff.   
Versions that followed were expanded by my reading of the literature and through field 
trials in community agencies.  
3. Consultation with expert evaluators.  Expert review was sought throughout the initial 
development of the SOC and included:  (a) personal communication, (b) a RWJF 
convened meeting, (c) contracted consultation, and (d) a site visit by an evaluator other 
then the developer.  The notes and correspondence from these consultations comprise a 
body of advice on validation of the SOC, as each of these is described more specifically 
below. 
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 (a) Personal communication on the development was sought from eminent evaluators at 
both the 2000 and 2001 annual meetings of the American Evaluation Association 
(AEA).  At the meetings informal advice was provided by John Stevenson, Paul Florin, 
Mary Ann Scherier, Vincent Francisco, and William Shadish all of whom provided 
references and encouragement in the initial development of what would emerge as 
SOC.  I have notes and correspondence from these conversations. 
(b) A meeting was convened by the RWJF program officer (Dr. Leviton) to consider 
issues in further developing SOC.  Attending that meeting were Drs. John Stevenson, 
Paul Florin, David Chavez, David Hunter, Jackie Kaye, and Robin Miller.  Dr. Hunter 
is leading a group at the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation working on issues of 
building organizational capacity.  I have notes and correspondence relating to this 
meeting. 
(c) Ongoing consultation on matters relating to SOC design, developing reliability, and 
validity was arranged by the RWJF.  Paul Florin and John Stevenson of the University 
of Rhode Island and Vincent Francisco of Kansas University served in this capacity.  
Drs. Florin and Stevenson are evaluators affiliated with the Community Research and 
Services Team in the Department of Psychology.  Dr. Francisco is affiliated with the 
Department of Human Development at Kansas University and is co-developer of the 
Community Tool Box, a comprehensive collection of tools and publications to enhance 
community organizational capacity made available through the internet. I have notes 
and written advice spanning a 12-month time from the consultants. 
(d) Site visit and pilot.  Dr. Francisco was retained by the RWJF to assess the SOC 
development and administration.  He reviewed the SOC construction and 
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 administration instructions, after which he participated in administering the SOC at an 
agency, on May 10 and 11, 2001.  Records of his correspondence, pilot test notes, 
suggestions, and his report to RWJF are sources of data for this study.  
4.  Stakeholder feedback.  Two sets of stakeholder have provided feedback that contributes 
to the validation of the SOC; RWJF staff and staff in agencies that have been assessed 
using the instrument.   Foundation responses to the SOC have been on-going and 
provide data about the formative process of both the development of the SOC and of 
the intervention it was developed to assess.  This is a rich record because of complexity 
of issues, length of the formative process, and diversity of foundation stakeholder 
concerns.  SOC profiles have been developed for 15 agencies to date.  Our practice is to 
score an agency on the SOC and then meet with agency staff to present our 
observations and to obtain their feedback.  Three agencies agreed to allow an in-depth 
assessment of their organizational capacity and the records of those transactions span 
periods of up to two years.   
3.2. Data analysis 
How these data will be used in various combinations to answer the three research 
questions is discussed next.  The first question (a) addresses the methods for investigating 
the validity of the main features. 
(a) The initial development of the central features of organizational capacity and the 
maturity model.  Two sources of data present the initial thinking about organizational 
capacity from the conventional program perspective and from an evaluation perspective.  
One source is a “Needs Identification and Self-Assessment Tool” (SAT) developed by 
the SABI program coordinator as a means of negotiating specific agency interventions to 
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 be funded by SABI.  This instrument can be viewed as representing the conventional 
wisdom for such assessments since it was created by a process of cutting and pasting 
items from several existing instruments.  The other source is the initial version of SOC 
developed in response to the evaluation needs of the project discussed in Chapter 2.  The 
analysis will compare the central features of the two instruments and illustrate the 
differing views of capacity they promote.  The product of this analysis will be an analysis 
of the similarities of the features of capacity addressed by both instruments and an 
explication of the differences produced by the two approaches in their initial application 
and the implications of those differences for SABI programming and evaluation 
(b) Analysis of the revisions of the initial SOC based on field trials in SABI grantees and in 
nonprofit community agencies in Pittsburgh.  The revisions of SOC resulting from pilot 
applications record the evolution of the initial concept as adapted or modified by practice.  
My plan is to compare the initial (July 23, 2000) and (February 2, 2003) latest versions 
and present the rationale for the changes. The result of this analysis is a description of 
why changes in the SOC were necessary including the rationale for and the benefit 
obtained from them.   
(c) Assessment of interrater reliability among the three SOC project staff.  The iterations of 
SOC provide evidence of its initial reliability.  The early application of SOC was 
examined for evidence of reliability among staff using the construct of analysis of the 
number of agreements divided by the sum of agreements and disagreements suggested by 
Miles and Huberman (1984).  My plan was to array each rater’s scores on each attribute 
for each feature and sub-feature across several observations scored on the SOC.  This 
analysis was intended to provide more help in explaining development of increasing or 
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 decreasing reliability.  Observations are made by each of three raters, the possible 
comparisons are:  
   (a) with (b),  
   (a) with (c), and   
   (b) with (c) 
A six-by-six contingency table was used to analyze the extent to which scores of each 
pair of observers agree.  Each of the SOC features was scored individually rather than in 
the aggregate for each organization.  The cells of the contingency table represent the 
stage of development with a cell for instances in which one rater scored an attribute and 
the second rater did not.  These were combined to give per cent agreement by features.  
An overall per cent agreement was not calculated as the features were unevenly 
developed and it would have been meaningless.  The initial per cent agreements were 
used to make more precise definitions for each attribute, and clearer distinctions between 
them.  Results should show improving reliability among the raters over time as the SOC 
was more precisely defined.  
(d)  Feedback from RWJF staff and agency officials.  Judgments of experts are frequently 
used in the validation of instrument construct and content validity.  Indicators of the 
validity of the SOC, then, are the responses of various experts and stakeholders affected 
or potentially affected by it.  Responses from RWJF, consultants retained by RWJF to 
provide advice them on SOC development, and agencies assessed were analyzed for 
evidence of validity or lack thereof.  These were considered the best available “experts” 
for determining the accuracy of the SOC for measuring organizational capacity to 
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 undertake new of expanded projects.  The next chapter presents the findings of these 
converging lines of evidence.   
 
3.3.  Data collection and use of the SOC 
 
The SOC was designed as an observational instrument to assess organizational stage of 
maturity at the time of the observation.  Raters were trained to follow a set of guidelines 
setting the conditions for use of the SOC.  These general guidelines included pre-
observation visit preparation, information sources, and   time required to complete the 
SOC.  These general guidelines are briefly outlined below. 
Pre-observation preparation.    All SOC observations were made on-site at the 
organizations being profiled.  Raters were trained to acquire and study as much 
information about each organization as possible prior to going on site to make the sites 
visits as efficient as possible.  An IRS 990 was reviewed for each organization to obtain 
an understanding of the general financial resource status of the organization.  IRS 990s 
are usually available through database services or may be requested directly from the 
organization.   If a 990 was not available, two or three annual financial reports would 
serve to orient the observer.  
Organizational and staffing charts were requested in advance but not always available 
prior to a site visit.  General information like age of the organization, size of the board, 
tenure of the executive would be collected if readily available and frequently some of this 
 54
 information was available from foundation files.  A series of board minutes would be 
reviewed to analyze board member participation.  Information not available prior to 
arriving on-site was requested at the beginning of the visit. 
  Information sources.  Observers interview an organization’s executive, board members, 
and key staff members to gain an understanding of how the organization actually 
functions.  The intent is to obtain information about structures, formal and informal 
systems, the extent of task specialization and role differentiation, and the specific nature 
of internal operations.    Observers were instructed to identify attributes for each of SOC 
feature that indicate stages of maturation or the direction of change of a feature.  
Interviews would continue until no additional information was being obtained or until the 
observer had sufficient information to rate 12 or more attributes of each feature.  
Time required.  The time required to produce a SOC profile varies with the size and 
complexity of the organization being observed from a day to several days.  For example, 
one SABI organization observed had been in existence for more than five years, but had 
only two full time staff, limited space and infrastructure, and a single core service.  The 
SOC profile was produced in a matter of only a few hours.  On the other extreme, a large 
Health Center with an annual operating budget of 11.5 million dollars, operating in 
several communities, and offering a range of medical and dental services, required two 
week-long visits to produce a SOC profile accurately.   
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4. VALIDITY OF THE SOC 
 
4.1. Context for initial development of the SOC 
On February 18, 2000, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) held a meeting to 
consider a demonstration program initiative to build community agency capacity.  Three 
groups of stakeholders attended the meeting: program staff, financial staff, and evaluation 
staff.  Each stakeholder group was represented by three levels of responsibilities and 
experience: a vice-president, senior program or finance officers, and program or finance 
officers.  The attendees represented, in the developer’s experience, a diverse and 
impressive array of experience and expertise.  The author was invited to attend the 
meeting as an evaluation and community organization consultant based on experience in 
both domains.  The foundation wanted to consider a problem it was experiencing when 
making grants to small community organizations.  Often, these organizations were unable 
to complete RWJF projects as proposed.  This problem was thought to be especially acute 
with smaller community agencies and related to insufficient organizational capacity.  A 
demonstration initiative was being considered to improve agency capacity to implement 
new or expanded activities or to sustain them after RWJF funding was completed.  The 
contemplated demonstration was to consist of training and technical assistance (T&TA) 
for a period of three to six months with “catalyst” grants available to some of the grantees 
with which to make limited purchases to support their participation in the T&TA.  The 
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 interventions were estimated to cost $15,000 to $20,000 each.  The staff envisioned an 
initiative of three to five years with as many as 15 to 20 grantees per year.  The 
demonstration was named the Small Agency Building Initiative (SABI) and was planned 
to begin within 60 to 90 days of the meeting, about May 2000. 
 
As a former small agency executive director, the author agreed that the initiative 
addressed a significant problem.  As an evaluator, the author had concerns about the 
evaluability of the initiative as proposed, based on both experience and review of the 
evaluation utilization literature.  The chief concerns were the lack of a formative 
evaluation stage and an accelerated time table.  Often social interventions are not fully 
developed or implemented before they are evaluated, resulting in an unfair test of the 
intervention.  In federal programs, Wholey and colleagues found premature evaluation so 
prevalent that they created “evaluability assessment” as a method for determining 
whether an intervention or program was sufficiently developed to support an evaluation 
(Horst et al., 1974; Rutman, 1980; Wholey, 1994).  Lipsey concluded that the large 
majority of evaluation research designs amount to “black box” research because of poorly 
developed theory or causal models (Lipsey, 1988; Lipsey et al., 1985), or because the 
designs and measures are not of sufficient sensitivity to detect the intervention effects 
they purport to measure (Lipsey, 1990).  Reichardt (1994) asserts that evaluations fail to 
detect effects because the interventions or programs are of insufficient strength to 
produce effects large enough to measure.  So pervasive are failures to adequately develop 
implementation monitoring, intervention models, or evaluation methods, that the term 
 57
 formative insufficiency was coined to describe the general failure to adequately prepare 
for outcome or summative evaluation (Leviton & Schuh, 1999).  
 
For this study, the formative evaluation phase or formative stage is understood to include 
all of the front-end effort necessary to prepare social interventions adequately for 
successful summative or outcome evaluation (Wholey, 1994; Reicardt, 1994; Lipsey et 
al., 1985 & 1990; Sechrest et al., 1979; Tukey, 1976; Weiss, 1972; Suchman, 1970; 
Scriven, 1967).  The accelerated timetable planned by the foundation implied that not 
enough time would be available for an adequate formative stage in which to develop an 
intervention, select grantee participants to receive the intervention, and develop 
appropriate evaluation measures to assess the effects of the intervention.    
The absence of a sufficient formative stage has several potentially adverse implications 
for successful evaluation of social interventions, among which are:   
A formative stage is frequently necessary in order to optimize an intervention (Scriven, 
1967).  Less-than-optimal interventions represent weakened or diluted implementations 
of what could possibly be strong ones.  Evaluation of them results in ambiguous or null 
findings.  Consequently, potentially sound interventions do not receive a fair test, owing 
to flawed implementation ( Reichardt, 1994; Lipsey et al., 1985; Yeaton, 1985; Yeaton & 
Sechrest, 1981; Sechrest et al., 1979).   
A formative stage is where intervention concepts are piloted to see how they will work in 
real-world settings (Suchman, 1970; Weiss, 1972).  Refinement of intervention 
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 components or concepts frequently takes the iterative form of implementation, 
assessment, refinement, and implementation.  Failure to complete the refinement of 
concepts prior to evaluation can result in changes to interventions that make the designed 
evaluation irrelevant to the “morphed” intervention. 
A formative stage is where measures to be employed are validated for use in evaluating 
the specific intervention.  The sensitivity of the proposed methods and measures to detect 
intervention effects should be understood prior to employing them in an experimental or 
quasi-experimental evaluation (Lipsey, 1990).  Reichardt (1994) observed that most 
reported social interventions would be able to produce only small to moderate results.   
Lipsey and his colleagues found that evaluation designs had the power to detect only 
large to moderate effects in as much as 60% to 90% of the evaluations they studied.  On a 
practical level, the author has frequently heard program staff assert that they “know we 
make a difference” regardless of the ambiguous evaluation findings.   
The SABI initiative needed a formative stage for work in all three of the areas.  The 
agencies chosen to participate in SABI were likely to be varied in their organizational 
structures, the services they provided, and  their developmental needs.  Therefore, T&TA 
interventions that would be provided to these agencies could also be expected to vary.  
There was no way of planning what might be required to optimize the intervention before 
its development and implementation.   The author recommended a two-year formative 
stage followed by a three-year summative evaluation stage.  The formative stage, in 
which the intervention, management infrastructure, and evaluation methods and 
instruments would be developed, would consist of an iterative process of development, 
pilot implementation in a few organizations, and revision as necessary.  This process was 
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 intended to be consistent with Suchman’s (1967) five-stage model of demonstration 
program development as updated by Carol Weiss (1972) and the author (see Figure 2.1 in 
Chapter 2) and consisting of: 
I. Exploratory stage, 
II. Pilot stage, 
III. Model stage, 
IV. Prototype stage 
V. Institutional stage 
 
Stages I and II in this model are the formative stages in Scriven’s distinction between 
formative and summative evaluation in that they are preparatory to testing models in 
stage III of Suchman’s model. 
   
A summative evaluation stage (stage III in Suchman’s construct) of three years to test the 
SABI demonstration model would follow.  This recommendation received the support of 
the evaluation staff at the meeting but was not completely endorsed by the program and 
financial staffs, who questioned the need for such extensive formative work.  The result 
was a compromise whereby the SABI initiative was limited to two years with a three-
month startup.  During the two years of the demonstration, organizations were to be 
selected to participate in one of three cohorts of five organizations each.  Development of 
new instrumentation was necessary because the state of the art of evaluation of nonprofit 
capacity was inadequately developed.  The rationale for developing new instrumentation 
for evaluating SABI was:     
1. The planned SABI intervention for each organization was limited in scope and duration, 
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 implying that the resulting effects in organizational capacity would be predictably small 
to moderate at best (Lipsey, 1990; Tukey, 1976; Reichardt, 1994; Yeaton & Sechrest, 
1981).  Measuring small to moderate effects requires sensitive methods and measures that 
can detect change in capacity.  No instruments meeting these criteria for assessing 
organizational capacity were found. 
2. The concept of organizational capacity was a large molar object inasmuch as it comprises 
a potentially complex array of components among which the mediating and moderating 
relationships are largely unverified (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  Improving the evaluation 
of nonprofit organizational capacity required development of more complex evaluation 
methods to match the complexity of organizational capacity and interventions to improve 
it (Lipsey, 1988) and to advance our understanding beyond simple description to 
explanation (Shadish, Cook, &  Campbell, 2002).  The decision to construct new 
instrumentation, called Staging Organizational Capacity (SOC), for use in evaluating 
SABI included an implied obligation to establish its validity, for two important reasons.  
First, the chances of conducting an evaluation that is recognized as successful are greatly 
improved with measures and methods that have been validated (Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955; Freeman, 1971).  Lipsey et al. (1985) conclude that the use of unvalidated 
instruments is a major contributor to the failure of evaluation to produce other than 
ambiguous or null results.   
 
Second, evidence of validity is essential for gaining acceptance of innovations on established 
practice or business-as-usual (Patton, 1978).   The failure to achieve consensus on the 
recommendation for the nature and duration of a formative stage for SABI was an indication 
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 that a need for innovation in methods or instrumentation was not shared equally among the 
three stakeholder groups: the evaluation, program, and fiscal staff.  It was incumbent on the 
evaluators to demonstrate the efficacy of investing in development of the SOC.  It was felt 
important to produce evidence that the SOC could yield different or better results than 
conventional practice for assessing nonprofit organizational capacity.    
 
The remainder of this chapter presents evidence for the validity of SOC in four sections: 
The first section examines evidence that SOC produces results on the major dimensions 
of organizational capacity that are more comprehensive and detailed than those occurring 
with conventional approaches and instruments.  The second section examines evidence 
that the SOC operationalizes or clarifies the meaning of organizational capacity, 
especially as it affects an organization’s ability to implement expanded or new projects.  
This is an aspect of construct validation as used by Cronbach and Meehl (1955).  The 
third section investigates evidence from three raters with different nonprofit organizations 
that the SOC produces similar results when different users apply it to the same 
organization.  This dimension relates to reliability across users, which is necessary for 
validation of the instrument as a tool for use by other individuals and organizations.  The 
fourth section presents further evidence of the SOC’s construct validity and practical 
utility through reactions from experts and stakeholders as it was used in practical settings.   
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 4.2. Comparison of the SOC and SAT instruments  
Background.  The SABI program was preparing to select an initial cohort of grantees in 
fall 2000.  Early iterations of the SOC had been circulated at that time.  However, the 
SOC was an original approach, synthesizing knowledge from such diverse sources as 
cognitive psychology to systems theory, and evaluation to organizational development.  
This synthesis was well grounded in social science and experience but it had not been 
validated as more relevant than conventional methods of assessing the capacity of 
nonprofit community organizations.  The SABI program staff was reluctant to rely on the 
SOC profiles for an initial assessment of grantee capacity, preferring to adopt 
conventional approaches employed by other foundations.  They wanted a self-assessment 
approach by which grantees would set priorities on the type of T&TA they wanted.  This, 
they felt, would allow the SABI to be more efficient by combining group training in a 
central location with on-site assistance to reinforce the training.  The author had 
presented evidence to support the efficacy of targeting the SABI intervention to the stage 
of development of the organization receiving it.  Stage-appropriate interventions tend to 
be stronger and more successful than are more general or one-size-fits-all interventions 
(Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990; Yeaton & Sechrest, 1981).  The evaluation staff was 
convinced of the value of the SOC and committed to its development and use.  
Negotiations failed to produce a consensus on use of a single instrument, and it was 
understood that the program staff would adopt or develop a conventional tool to be 
administered concurrently with the SOC in initial assessment for the first cohort grantees.  
Therefore, two alternative instruments were being developed at the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation:  the Needs Identification and Self Assessment Tool (SAT) being constructed 
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 by the program side of SABI and the Staging Organizational Capacity (SOC) instrument 
under development by the evaluation side.  The SAT was constructed in a two week 
period in November 2000 and comprised items taken from several instruments used by 
other foundations for assessing organizational capacity. These included the National 
Endowment for the Arts’ Organizational Self-Assessment Tool, Local Initiative Support 
Corporation’s Capacity Building Survey, and an Irvine Foundation Assessment Tool.  
None of these instruments had reported assessment information on validity or reliability.  
However, even had these instruments been validated, there could be little or no carryover 
to the SAT.  Established reliability and validity could be expected to change when 
applied in novel or adulterated ways (Shadish et al., 1981).  The SAT, comprising items 
from several existing instruments, was a new and untested instrument, having only face 
validity based on the previous instruments and SABI developers’ expertise.   
The SOC had been under development for six months and involved a set of three 
progressive steps.  The first step was to develop a set of features that were postulated to 
change as organizations matured.  These were applied retroactively to organizations with 
data on file as a result of previous work.  For example, the author assessed 26 small 
community organizations for the William Penn Foundation’s anti-violence program and 
had extensive experience with one demonstration program funded by the Staunton Farm 
Foundation.  An iterative process was applied, consisting of (1) development of features 
from the literature, followed by (2) application to a case in the files, followed by (3) 
revision as indicated by the application, and finally (4) application of the revised SOC to 
another case. 
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 Evidence that the SOC had the potential of moving beyond description of an 
organization’s capacity to explanation for that status was emerging at this very early 
developmental period.  An illustrative example of the explanatory capability of the SOC 
occurred when it was administered ex post facto to the Staunton Farm project.  The 
project was a collaborative effort between the University of Pittsburgh and a new 
nonprofit community organization.  The foundation was interested in supporting the new 
organization as well as piloting the demonstration.  The project did not accomplish its 
objectives to implement the demonstration intervention as planned and failed to perform 
at the levels proposed.  From the university perspective, the project was a failure because 
the community organization was unable to fulfill its agreed upon responsibilities.  The 
SOC profile revealed that the organization did not possess sufficient capacity to operate 
on equal terms with the university.  The staff was cross-subsidized for all administrative 
functions (Estelle, 1983).  In other words, project funds earmarked to pay staff to deliver 
services were their only support.  However, staff needed to perform additional 
organizational duties not supported from other sources like book-keeping, proposal 
writing, and other fund raising-activities.   The SOC provided a framework for analyzing 
and explaining this phenomenon in a more objective manner.  Viewed from this new 
perspective, the project was not a complete failure.  The cross-subsidization contributed 
to sustaining the organization, and it has remained a viable part of the community.  Had 
we had the insight of the SOC perspective, the project could easily have been designed to 
better accommodate both the demonstration project needs of the University and the 
capacity building needs of the community organization of concern to the Staunton Farms 
Foundation. 
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The second step in the evolution of the SOC was to apply the instrument in the field.  
Taking this step required recruiting volunteer organizations that would agree to 
participate in having their SOC profile completed.  The first organizations were ones with 
which the author had worked in some capacity in the past.  Organizations in Pittsburgh 
and in the Washington, D. C., area were selected to reduce travel time and expenses.  
Five organizations agreed to participate in exchange for receiving an orientation to the 
SOC, the resulting profiles, and assistance in understanding the implications of any issues 
that might arise as a result of the profiles.  By agreement, the presentation of each profile 
was two-way, with the organization receiving the observations of an outside evaluation 
professional and the evaluator receiving feedback about the accuracy and utility of the 
process.  Each of the organizations in which the SOC was piloted confirmed the accuracy 
and relevance of the profile, and each requested additional technical assistance based on 
the profile developed.   
 
One organization profiled was a community mental health center with an annual 
operating budget of approximately $11.5 million.  The executive director requested a 
follow-up to the presentation of the profile for the purpose of “discussing discrepancies 
with the SOC profile.” With feelings of concern over what the profile had missed, the 
author and his colleagues reminded themselves that encountering some disagreement 
with the reported profile was the purpose of the pilot and that some error was inevitable.  
Surprisingly, the executive director did not disagree with the profile.  Rather, she wanted 
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 to discuss ways to reduce the variance between her preconceived notion of the 
organization’s maturity and the SOC profile.  Organizations participating in the pilot test 
agreed, without exception, that the resulting descriptions of their organizations were 
accurate.  Two major lessons were learned by the “real world” pilot test; (1) maturity on 
features was not necessarily related to size of the organization, and (2) accurate, 
meaningful profiles of organizational maturation could be completed rather quickly.  The 
organizations in which the pilots were conducted ranged in size, as indicated by their 
annual operating budgets, from $300,000 to $11,500,000.  Their organizational ages 
ranged from two years to 22 years.  
  
Initial profiles were based on varying amounts of exposure to the organizations (see 
Chapter 3).  The first one was completed through a series of weekly meetings of one to 
three hours’ duration over the course of three months.  Another was based on a two-day 
intensive on-site visit.    
 
The third developmental step of SOC applied drafts of the two instruments, the SOC and 
the SAT, to five SABI grantees in November and December 2000.  The data available for 
application of both instruments were identical since they were completed during 
interviews attended by both program and evaluation staff.  A necessary first step in 
validating the SOC was to demonstrate to the program staff and the evaluation staff that 
the SOC and SAT addressed comparable domains, but that the SOC addressed 
organizational capacity more clearly and in greater depth than the SAT.  In the remainder 
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 of this section, the SAT is considered to represent the normal or usual method of 
assessing organizational capacity, since it was derived from several exemplars for 
assessing capacity from the program staff perspective and was employed for SABI.  The 
SOC is compared to the SAT to document that it addressed central dimensions of 
organizational capacity, and to describe differences in form and function between the two 
approaches for assessing organizational capacity.  The next section describes the two 
instruments and their development, followed by a discussion of their similarities and 
differences, and concluding with an analysis of the effect of those differences on the 
information each provides. 
 
4.2.1. The Self Assessment Tool (SAT) (Draft of November 20, 2000.) 
 
The SAT, for use in assessing grantee organizational capacity technical assistance (TA) 
needs and priorities, represents a conventional approach to organizational assessment.  Its 
construction, based primarily on the literature and experience of other major foundations, 
used parts of existing instruments without attention to validity other than the stated 
purpose of assessing organizational capacity for their development.  The purpose of the 
SAT was to identify grantee capacity development needs so that T & TA could be 
targeted to those needs that grantees shared in common.  The SAT is intended to be 
completed by grantee staff, who were asked by a foundation program manager to rate 
attributes of each of 11 central features on a four-point scales as:  
(1) Well developed, 
(2) Adequately developed,  
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 (3) Needs development, or  
(4) Not applicable.   
The eleven features of the SAT rated were:  
• Organizational Purpose.  The organization’s mission and vision statements and a 
written history that are reviewed, understood, and agreed upon by key 
stakeholders. 
• Governance.  Attributes of the board of directors and their policies and 
procedures.  
• Planning.   Comprehensive multi-year formal plan that is updated annually. 
• Legal.  Access to counsel, the existence of formal personnel and grievance 
policies, compliance with reporting and legal requirements, and the existence of 
outstanding lawsuits. 
• External Environment.   The understanding and knowledge of the community in 
which an organization operates. 
• Programs.  Program planning, communication of vision, method of evaluation, 
and long-term planning.  
• Staff/Communications/Decision-making. Reporting relationships, job descriptions, 
administrative leadership, staff and board communications, planning, staff 
experience and formal human resources functions like personnel policies and 
performance reviews, salary scales, staff morale, and office equipment. 
• Public/Community Relations.  Clarity of organizational image communicated to 
the public, the organizational chart, handling of complaints and queries from the 
public, annual public relations plan, effectiveness in representing the organization, 
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 size of staff and budget, and the organization’s publications. 
• Financial Management. The budgeting process, computerized accounting 
systems, system for cash flow projections, ability to pay accounts within 30 days, 
system of internal controls, payroll tax deposits, lines of credit, investment 
returns, staff size and experience. 
• Computer Systems and Hardware.  Computer support in various functional areas 
like financial management and planning, computer training for staff, software 
systems, and hardware acquisitions. 
• Fund raising.  Process for setting annual goals; mechanisms for staff and board 
input; size and experience of staff; grant writing expertise; levels of funding from 
government, nonprofit, profit, and individual sources; mechanisms monitoring 
and expanding donor base, and budget for fund-raising expenses.   
In addition, grantees were asked to prioritize the “three most pressing technical assistance needs” 
as identified by staff.  It was felt that grantees would identify those features for which they were 
deficient and would identify their highest priority needs as being the most pressing.  These would 
then be analyzed by the program staff to identify clusters of need that would then be targeted to 
obtain maximum benefit from the limited T & TA resources.  The intervention could combine 
centralized training with on-site individualized technical assistance for greater economy. 
 
4.2.2.  The Staging Organizational Capacity (SOC 1), (Draft of November 2, 2000.)  
 
The SOC 1 is a maturity model developed to assess an organization’s stage of 
development on key features that affect its ability to implement new or expanded 
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 community innovations (see Appendix B).  Grounded on a wide range of organizational, 
systems, and management research and associated literature, it is scored by an 
experienced organizational development observer.  Aspects of six central organizational 
attributes are rated on five stages of development or maturity ranging from “least 
developed” to “most developed.”  The six SOC 1 features were: 
Governance.  Legal status of organization and associated documents, board composition 
and functioning, and the relationship between board and staff. 
Service Systems.  Horizontal and vertical structure of the core services. 
Service or Programs Skill Development. Skill and experience of staff in core service 
roles.  
Role Function and Specialization. Degree to which an organization has differentiated its 
service and administrative functions; degree to which tasks are specialized by degree of 
skill or training they require.  
Administrative Skill Development.  Skills and experience of the administrative staff.  
Financial Maturity. Organization’s funding history and its ability to generate funds with 
which to sustain itself.   
These features were chosen because they were both (a) consistent with the program 
staff’s features of interest and (b) appeared to change over time based on experience and 
evidence in the literature that they vary with organizational maturity, growth, age, or life-
cycle. 
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The SOC 1 produced a profile of organizational stage of development on each of the six 
features that is based on the ratings of an outside observer who has extensive experience 
in studying organizations and their behavior.  The rationale for the SOC 1 was based on 
the organizational life-cycle literature, which suggests that organizations have a general 
pattern of maturation in common.  Cognitive research suggests that intuitive recognition 
of underlying patterns is a characteristic developed by experts in a given domain.  Putting 
these maxims together, it seems reasonable to expect that SOC 1 observers with 
considerable organizational experience would produce comparable profiles based on 
underlying patterns of organizational maturity, thereby, conferring on the SOC 1 a high 
degree of reliability and sensitivity based on observer expertise.  
The SAT and the SOC overlap considerably in the dimensions of organizational capacity they 
measure.  Yet, they tend to produce different results with the SAT focused on formal 
development of policies and procedures and the SOC 1 more focused on the dynamics of 
organizational growth and maturation.  Explaining how and why this is so requires a closer 
examination of the similarities and differences between the two instruments and is the subject of 
the next section.  
 
 
4.2.2.1. Similarities and differences between SOC 1 and SAT.     
 
Table 4.1, below, arrays the central features of the SAT and the SOC 1, and aligns them by 
functional substance as closely as the two approaches permit.  The numbered and italicized items 
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 in Table 4.1 indicate the central features of organizational capacity as presented in the 
description in the previous section.   Selected attributes of each feature are identified and listed 
below the feature they describe.  Attributes of a feature are not italicized.   The SAT contains 
eleven features and the SOC 1 contains six.  These features have been aligned to reflect 
functional aspects of capacity treated by each instrument.  One will notice considerable 
functional overlap in the features of capacity addressed by both instruments.  Only the SOC 
feature (6) Financial Maturity does not have some functional overlap in the SAT.   Each 
instrument defines governance differently.  For example, the SOC defines governance more 
broadly than the SAT as can be seen in table 4.1, which shows that the SOC feature (1) 
Governance functionally relates to attributes of three SAT features; (1)Organizational purpose, 
(2) Governance, and (3) Legal.  The attributes of governance for the SAT reveal a focus on 
formal development of documents and policies like “written mission statement” or board “job 
descriptions.”   The SOC 1 focus on governance is not on formal development but, rather, on 
organizational behavior like how the board organizes itself or how it makes decisions.   
The SOC 1 did not assess mission statements since they have not been demonstrated to change in 
systematic ways as organizations mature and do not directly alter an organization’s capacity to 
expand their current services or start new ones.  
    
The SAT feature (3) Legal continues the pattern of placing emphasis on the “adequacy” of 
formal development of policies and procedures and has no direct analog in the SOC.  Instead, the 
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 Table 4.1:  
Central Features of SAT and SOC 
Self Assessment Tool (SAT) 
November, 2000 
Staging Organizational Capacity (SOC 1) 
November, 2000 
1. Organizational purpose 
 Written mission/vision statements & 
organization history 
2. Governance (Board of Directors) 
Job descriptions 
By-laws 
Meetings and attendance 
Functioning/roles 
Involvement of staff 
3. Legal 
Counsel 
Insurance 
Policies and Procedures 
1. Governance 
 
 
 
  Board of Directors 
Selection and characteristics 
Bylaws 
Meetings and attendance 
Functioning/roles 
Organization of Board 
Board decision-making 
     Charter and Licenses  
 
4. External Environment 
Local social & economic climate 
Knowledge of community & region 
2. Appropriateness and adequacy of 
Service Program Skills 
5. Programs 
Provision for maintaining continuity 
Costing program elements 
Evaluation 
 
3. Service Systems Maturity  
Vertical/horizontal differentiation 
Service niche 
 
4. Role Function and Specialization 
Service and Administrative 
differentiation 
6. Staff/ Communications/ Decision-making 
Organizational chart 
Staff & board communication 
Staff size appropriate 
Job descriptions 
Salary scale 
Office equipment 
4. Role Function and Specialization 
Service and Administrative 
differentiation 
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 7. Planning 
Comprehensive written organizational 
plan 
8. Public/Community Relations 
Effectiveness in representing the 
organization 
Mechanism for handling public 
communications 
Organization’s publications 
PR budget 
9. Financial Management 
Budgeting system 
Accounting system 
Written cost controls 
Annual audit 
Payroll tax deposits 
Debt management 
Line of credit 
Returns on investments 
10. Computer Systems and Operations 
Computer training for staff 
Software systems 
Hardware acquisitions 
11. Fundraising 
Government grants 
Development software  
Donor information system 
Fundraising budget 
Grant writing expertise 
Development research capacity 
Development staff 
4. Role Function and Specialization 
     Service and Administrative 
differentiation 
5. Administrative Skill Development 
 
Staff skills & experience 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 6. Financial Resources Maturity  
     Funding history and stability 
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 SOC reviews legal or conditional constraints contained in organizational charters and licenses 
since they can and, frequently do, directly limit or constrain capacity.  For example, an inpatient 
substance abuse treatment center that could potentially benefit from expanding its services may 
be constrained by the number of beds permitted by its license.   
 
The SAT feature (4) External Environment has no direct SOC 1 analog because many 
SOC organizational features can be shown to contribute to environmental relationships, 
including the board, the executive director and key staff, and core service providers.  
Also, the SOC 1 recognizes that the robustness or strength of an organization’s programs 
or services as an indicator of its environmental relationships.  In other words, if programs 
are not meeting a need they will not long be in business. 
 
 The SAT feature (5) Programs is most analogous to the SOC 1 features (3) Service 
System Maturity and (4) Role Function and Specialization.  The SOC 1 examines the 
maturity of programs or services of nonprofit organizations in terms of their structural 
characteristics.  For example, taller and wider structures are usually found in more mature 
organizations.  How organizations cost their services also differs with stage of maturity 
and is, in part, a function of administrative/service differentiation and task specialization.    
The SAT assesses program attributes relating to sustainability and evaluation and the 
SOC 1 assesses how services are structured vertically and horizontally.  The SOC parses 
the SAT attributes to other features.  For example, the SAT attribute “Costing program 
elements” is accommodated by the SOC 1 as a function of administrative differentiation.  
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 SAT attribute “Maintaining continuity” is parsed as attributes of the SOC’s assessment of 
(6) Financial Maturity. 
 
 The SAT feature (6) Staff/Communications/Decision-making is a conglomerate feature 
analogous to the SOC 1 feature (4) Role Function and Specialization, which seeks to describe the 
degree to which organizational roles are differentiated, or separated, and the degree to which 
those roles have higher level functions supported.  For example, in small, less-developed 
nonprofit organizations, one can frequently find an executive director who is responsible for 
planning, reporting, human relations functions, and fund-raising.  Such a director may be highly 
experienced and well motivated.  But that director will be hard-pressed to perform all of those 
functions consistently at a high level.  More mature organizations will support the executive 
director’s job and specialize those various roles to two or three deputies, thereby improving 
performance.  It is not unusual to see small organizations possessing a bookkeeper in addition to 
an executive director.  Typically, the person holding that job has a variety of responsibilities, 
some routine like getting the payroll out and filing tax reports, and some higher level tasks like 
budgeting and forecasting.  In this case, greater productivity can be achieved by differentiating 
the routine tasks from the higher order tasks.  In more mature organizations we find more 
experienced financial staff freed from the routine tasks in order to attend to higher order tasks by 
the support of less experienced and less costly staff clerical and bookkeeping staff.  
SAT features (7) Planning, (8) Public/Community Relations, (9) Financial Management, (10) 
Computer Systems and Operations, and (11) Fund-raising are all internal operations that may be 
components of an organization’s administrative infrastructure.  The SAT implies that all 
organizations have, or should have, these features, and that they can be assessed as “well 
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 developed, adequately developed, needs to be developed, or not applicable.”  The SOC 1 treats 
characteristics like public relations and communications as internal operations that may or may 
not exist within a given organization and for which the stage of maturity of each depends on the 
maturity of the SOC features (4) Role Function and Specialization and (5) Administrative Skill 
Development.  Not every organization will have all of the SAT features like computer systems or 
public relations functions.  But all organizations will have internal operations that can be 
assessed in terms of functional differentiation, task specialization, and experience and skills of 
staff.  As discussed above with planning, internal operations tend to be put together uniquely by 
organizations using whatever resources may be available.  Internal operations in nonprofit 
organizations may be pieced together or structured in a variety of ways;  integrated or dispersed, 
centralized or decentralized, formal or informal.  Therefore, they appear unique with each 
organization making them difficult to describe systematically.  However, the productivity and 
maturity of all internal operations can be expressed in terms of the SOC features (4) Role 
Function and Specialization and (5) Administrative Skill Development.   
 
One feature on Table 4.1 remains to be described, the SOC feature (6) Financial 
Maturity, which stands alone as having no functional analog on the SAT.  Nonprofit 
organizations appear to systematically mature in the manner in which they obtain their 
funding from unstable sources to more stable sources, from short-term to long-term 
funding, and from inadequate cost recovery to more reasonable cost recovery.  
Considerable evidence supporting the importance of financial maturity is derived from 
the recently emerging research on financial vulnerability made possible with the 
availability of the Internal Revenue Service form 990 reports required of nonprofit 
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 organizations.  This research suggests that financial maturity is a function of the stability 
and robustness of organizational income.  Stability is used in the sense that operating 
margins are positive and robustness in the sense that organizations possess diverse 
sources of income (Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Ritchie & 
Kolodinsky, 2003).  This research has achieved good validity in predicting nonprofit 
organizational failure.  The SOC applies indicators of robustness or vulnerability in 
assessing organizational funding history to identify trends in either direction as indicators 
of capacity to expand or take on additional work.    
 
Analysis 
The two approaches to assessing organizational capacity identified different capacity-
related issues during site visits to the five first cohort SABI grantees.  The priorities or 
“needs” identified through use of the SAT were similar in all five agencies of the cohort.  
All five agencies placed high priority on some form of "marketing and public relations."  
In addition, four of them also indicated that technical assistance in fund-raising was a 
priority.  These two clusters justified an emphasis on group training in the areas of 
communications and fund raising.  Less focused needs, like computer technology and 
database development, were left for individual technical assistance or were not addressed.     
 
Use of the SOC produced a more varied picture that did not emerge from the Self 
Assessment Tool.  For example, the Agency #2 and the Agency #5 were both assessed as 
agencies in transition, either to a higher developmental level or expansion at the same 
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 level.  Both cited problems resulting from sustained growth of clients as threats to 
maintenance of service quality.  Both agencies were sufficiently extended that their 
capacity to handle more clients or new programs was limited.  For both agencies, 
increases in capacity necessary to sustain growth had been obtained through increases in 
staff productivity (i.e., working longer hours and neglecting some tasks in favor of 
others).  There clearly was not much more capacity to be obtained in this fashion for 
either agency.     
 
The Agency #4 was making a significant jump from one level of operations to another.  The 
operating budget of $339,000 represented a 62% increase over that of each of the previous two 
years.  Making such growth does not automatically mean that the agency increases its capacity.  
In fact, the Center reported that it expected to experience start-up problems with its new project.  
Start-up problems are a significant indicator that an agency does not have the reserve capacity to 
implement new or expanded endeavors.   
 
The A SABI funded Health Center was found to have highly developed core services but 
an administrative capacity and governance structure at a similar level of development as 
that of the much smaller Agency #5.  Both organizations were programs in much larger 
parent organizations with governance provided by advisory boards.  Both had small part-
time administrative staff.  Both organizations had the advantage of being able to approach 
their parent organizations for additional support in the event of crisis or emergency.  
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 The overall SOC assessment of the first cohort identified four agencies experiencing 
transitional stress, two with stress from growth or expansion and two, with stress from 
environmental pressures.  The fifth agency appeared stable and occupied a niche in which 
it had no competition and considerable stability.  Capacity building T&TA could target 
improving productivity or infrastructure in the growth organizations for maximum effect.  
The two organizations experiencing environmental stress would benefit from assistance 
in improving their support development capacity.  The fifth agency might best benefit 
from assistance in differentiating its administrative infrastructure or its governance 
functions to build capacity as indicated by the lack of development of 
administrative/service differentiation by the SOC.      
 
The SAT described Agency #2 as placing high priority on “computerization.”   The SOC 
assessment revealed that senior staff were over-extended, in part because of having to do 
repetitive tasks and, in part, because of a need to do a mix of lower and higher level tasks.  
“Computerization” was their view of a method of improving senior staff productivity by 
freeing them from the need to work on lower level and repetitive tasks.  Computerization 
was interpreted with the SOC 1 as an expression of a symptom of an underlying problem 
rather than a solution. Several factors explain the differences in the SAT assessments and 
the SOC 1 profiles of the first cohort of SABI grantees; 
1. The SAT assessed organizational priorities in terms of adequacy of the formal processes 
and functions (e.g., job descriptions, plans, procedures), while the SOC used 
observational methods considered degree of formality as an indicator of stage of 
development.   
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 2. The SAT rating method was designed as a self-report instrument to elicit a prioritization 
of technical assistance “needs,” while the SOC employed observational methods to 
profile the pattern of development of organizational features. 
3. The SOC 1 emphasizes on developmental dynamics while the SAT focuses more on 
static indicators.  
4. The SAT focuses on how organizations present themselves to potential supporters while 
the SOC is concerned with how organizations actually get things done. 
These four points are considered in greater detail below. 
 
The SAT emphasis on adequacy of formal processes like long range planning, personnel 
policy manuals, and well crafted mission and vision statements was consistent with the 
goal of securing agreement on general substantive areas for which training and technical 
assistance could be provided.  This goal contrasted with the SOC goal of assessing 
organizational capacity to undertake new or expanded projects.  Not surprisingly, the 
results of applying the two instruments differed fundamentally.  The SAT asked each 
agency to record its self-assessment of its T&TA needs at the end of each section 
(Organizational Purpose, Governance, etc.).  There were nine sections for which T&TA 
was plausible, and there were five organizations in the first cohort, making possible a 
total of 45 individual responses.  Organizations identified T&TA needs in 42 of the 45 
(93%) spaces provided.  The nature of the instrument’s design and the process of its 
administration appeared to demand a response.   
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 The SAT asked each organization to identify its T&TA needs.  The use of the word need 
carries with it a connotation that the organizations were deficient in some quality 
necessary for good, or improved, performance.  The SAT emphasized formal 
development of plans, policies, and procedures.  The effect of this focus is to place higher 
value on more formally developed organizational features and to devalue informal ones.  
The SOC, on the other hand, recognizes the degree of formality or informality of 
functions or activities as indications of stages of maturity.  The SOC 1 does not imply 
that more formal systems are better than informal ones.  In fact, there are sound reasons 
for some organizations to eschew or reject more formal development.  Paul Light (1988), 
for example, observes that small horizontally structured organizations are not necessarily 
less productive than larger more vertically structures ones, but are more often innovative.  
Systems theory suggests that informal organizations are more responsive to their 
environments (Blau  & Scott, 1962).  To illustrate the difference in the two approaches 
consider the following example.  The SAT asked organizations to describe their 
“comprehensive, multi-year organizational plan in place and in use” on a scale from well 
developed to needs development.  A small community organization in the first SABI 
cohort responded that it did not have such a plan.  From the SOC perspective, not having 
a written plan did not mean that it had no plan.  The board and staff spent many hours 
informally discussing how to overcome a projected budget short-fall in the current year.  
The organization reported experiencing similar problems most years.  For SOC 1 
purposes the planning process was informal but had been effective in the past.  The 
planning was short-term as opposed to multi-year because of the immediate need to 
secure funding for their program for the remainder of the year.  Both board members and 
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 staff who were interviewed were in agreement about the necessary course of action.  
They did have a plan but it was an informal one.     
 
By describing organizational features in terms of stage of development, the SOC seeks to 
determine the dynamics of organizational capacity.  Features are not assumed to develop 
in only one direction.  They may mature to a more formal or structured stage or they may 
regress to a less mature stage to be more informal or less structured.  An example of this 
regression was found in a SABI community-based addiction treatment agency.  When 
first visited the organization had recently begun to develop a more highly differentiated 
administrative infrastructure by adding a second full-time person to handle financial and 
planning functions.  The organization had accumulated reserves equal to its six-month 
operating budget and was looking to expand its facility to accommodate the 
administrative growth and permit additional growth in service activities.  At the same 
time the board of directors had declined from twelve members to four individuals.  
Meeting times and agendas had become highly informal and irregular.  In the space of 30 
months the organization appeared less robust, exhibiting signs of vulnerability.  It had 
been certified to provide services supported from a new funding stream, but income 
generated from program services was not meeting the expenses.  Financial and equity 
reserves were being consumed to meet the income short-fall and the organization was in 
crisis mode to get back to stability.  This type of ebb and flow in maturation is not 
uncommon.          
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 Summary. 
1. Typical measures, such as the SAT, are developed to identify perceived “needs” and tend 
to emphasize formal attributes of organizations (bylaws, written plans, mission and vision 
statements, job descriptions, organizational charts, and annual reports).  These self-
identified “needs” are viewed from the perspective of participation in T & TA to more 
formally or “adequately” develop them.  The SOC employs a maturity model to identify 
the stage of development of key organizational features.  The SOC recognizes that how 
an organization represents itself to the world may not reflect actual maturity.  Charters 
and licenses are used to determine mandated limitations on capacity, bylaws are used to 
determine how formally or informally they are followed, and planning and other 
organizational functions are used as indicators of stage of maturity.   
2. The SOC 1 addressed nearly all of the topics addressed by the SAT, but often from a 
different perspective to focus on how the organization operates and on implications for 
capacity to undertake new or expanded projects.   
3. The SAT uses organizational self-assessment to identify T&TA needs. The resulting 
assessment of needs is based on staff perceptions of solutions to problems they are 
experiencing.  Frequently, these perceptions are symptoms of an underlying or more 
fundamental dysfunction.   The SOC assesses stage of development of features of 
capacity based on the judgment of trained and highly skilled external observers.  The 
resulting profile is more likely to address an underlying problem than a symptom of the 
problem.     
4. The SOC 1 deals with the dynamic, inter-related nature of development of organizational 
capacity and provides a basis for targeting T & TA to specific attributes of each 
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 organization.  The SAT tends to look at a static picture from the perspective of a typical 
stage three of development resulting in a “one size fits all” intervention design.   
4.3. Validity of SOC features and sub-features 
Validity of revisions of the initial version of the SOC are analyzed in this section.  Based 
on field trials with five SABI grantees and five additional nonprofit community agencies 
in Pittsburgh, these revisions document changes in the initial SOC conception of the 
maturity model as it evolved through a series of pilot tests.  This evolution represents an 
important step in the validation of the SOC made necessary because of its unique and 
innovative nature.  The concept of organizational capacity is generally viewed in molar 
terms (please refer to the discussion in Chapter 2) the parts of which are varied and 
vaguely defined.  Previous work in this area has largely been reported as “lessons 
learned” or “best practices,” indicating that development of a conceptual framework of 
organizational capacity has not advanced to the point of generating comparative data and 
systematic accumulation of knowledge about organizational capacity.  This youthful state 
of development of the concept of capacity complicates attempts to evaluate interventions 
designed to influence programmatic outcomes of capacity-building efforts.  The planning 
and conceptual efforts, both in terms of the interventions and of evaluation methods and 
measures used to assess them, represent our best judgments of the characteristics required 
to ensure success.   
 
SOC 1 innovated on conventional treatments of capacity by synthesizing knowledge from 
several diverse literatures thought to be relevant for understanding the concept of 
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 organizational capacity for undertaking new or expanded initiatives (see Chapters 1 and 
2) and by using a maturity model that focused on dynamic rather than static 
characteristics.  An iterative process of testing and revising the SOC in real-world 
conditions was undertaken as the second step in the process of developing and validating 
the instrument a step made necessary by the complex nature of organizations and the lack 
of validated theory to determine the features and attributes distinguishing one stage of 
development from another.  Comparing the changes resulting from piloting iterations of 
the SOC in the field documents this step of validating the instrument and approach to 
measuring organizational capacity. 
 
The rationale for these documented changes are analyzed and discussed below.  Table 4.2 
presents the features of both the initial SOC (SOC 1) and the final version as of this 
writing (SOC 11).  As might be inferred from the version numbers, there have been 11 
major iterations of the SOC recorded in the first three years of its development.  The table 
reveals that the overall number of features has remained basically the same, but they have 
been realigned and sub-features have been added.  Revisions were made based on several 
experiences: 
1. Indicators of change from prior research did not fit the maturity model stages well.   
2. Similar terms taken from different literatures were confusing to raters or unclear in 
application. 
3. The results obtained were static and not producing information about the dynamics of 
change consistent with understanding organizational maturation that affected 
implementation or expansion of projects. 
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 4. The results obtained were not directly related to organizational capacity (e.g. leadership). 
These observations are considered below, with examples and discussion of how SOC 11 
improves on the validity of SOC 1.  Table 4.2 compares the features of SOC 1 with those of SOC 
11.  A discussion of the changes and the rationale for them follows. 
 
Governance (feature 1 on Table 4.2) is defined broadly as the organization’s legal status 
and policy decision-making behavior for both versions of the SOC.  There is evidence 
that attributes of this feature change as organizations mature.  However, nothing in the 
literature established an easy fit of these changes to the SOC maturity model approach.  
Therefore, SOC 1 was constructed based on general inferences from the literature to be 
verified or modified as the instrument was piloted.    
 
In the field trials, it proved to be difficult to determine the direction in which this feature 
might be changing or be expected to change using the stage of development approach.  
However, a number of indicators of change in governance are described in the literature 
but had not been included because they could not be associated with a given stage of 
development.  As an enhancement to SOC 11, the sub-feature “uncalibrated indicators of 
change”  (1.A.) was added to accommodate predictors of the direction of change in 
governance that are independent of stage of development.  For example, boards of 
directors that are expanding beyond their initial level are typically predictive of greater 
maturation from one stage to the next, whereas boards that are decreasing in size due to 
attrition usually indicate regression to earlier levels of maturation.  Similarly, active 
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 participation by most board members indicates interest and commitment necessary for 
development, while active participation of only a few key members usually suggests 
regression to an earlier level of maturation.  The term “uncalibrated” indicator is intended 
to convey that these particular indicators are not related to specific stages of the model, 
but can indicate the direction of expected change in organizations at all stages.  
 
In applications of the SOC, the uncalibrated indicators of change appeared to provide 
important behavioral information concerning the dynamics of change in the development 
of governance in nonprofit organizations and tended to draw attention to the importance 
of the dynamics of change in assessing organizational capacity. 
 
Financial Resources (feature 2 on Table 4.2) maturity relates to the dynamics of funding 
streams of nonprofit organizations.  In general, mature organizations tend to have more 
stable and diverse funding streams than do less mature organizations.  The SOC was 
developed to characterize this feature on a continuum from highly unstable and 
unpredictable to highly stable and predictable.  In the field, these stages have proved to 
be informative and accurate but did not directly address the issue of sustainability.  
Sustainability is understood in the nonprofit world as the likelihood that an intervention 
(or organization) will be continued after grant support is no longer available.  The SABI, 
in particular, and the RWJF more generally, had indicated that “sustainability” of 
grantees and of grantee interventions was a primary concern.  As indicated in Chapter 2, 
much has been written about sustainability, but little research is reported on predictors of 
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 success in sustaining organizations or their interventions.  However, some research is 
emerging on probability of nonprofit organization failure based on analysis of IRS 990 
data.  Tuckman and Chang (1991) identified variables predictive of nonprofit 
organizational failure.  Their work has been replicated and extended (Greenlee& Trussel, 
2000; Froelich & Knoepfle, 2000; Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003), and has added to our 
understanding of the potential robustness of nonprofits.  These variables are reported to 
have good predictive validity. The dimension of financial vulnerability (2.A.) was added 
to the financial resources feature to more directly address the issue of sustainability.   The 
synthesis of vulnerability research was the only addition to SOC 11 for this feature.     
 
Service System Maturity, Feature 3, of the SOC 1 was intended to produce an assessment of the 
structure of each organization’s core services.  Applying the logic of organizational studies like 
that of Anthony Downs (1967) led to the hypothesis that taller organizational arrangements 
would tend to be more mature than shorter ones, and that they would also tend to be more formal 
and more highly specialized in role and task differentiation.  At the same time, feature 4, Role 
Specialization & Function, of SOC 1 was based on the nonprofit and organizational life cycle 
literatures suggesting that administrative differentiation (and efficiency) is related to maturation 
(Letts et al., 1999; Light, 1998; Quinn & Cameron, 1983).   It became clear in pilot applications 
that the two features were developmentally related to organizational maturity and were sub-
features of organizational maturity.  The chart reveals this redefinition on the SOC 11 as features 
3 A and B under Organizational Maturity.  Role Specialization & Function, feature 4, of SOC 1, 
was eliminated as a feature in SOC 11.  Instead, Administrative Differentiation was recast as a  
sub-feature of Organizational Maturity.  Administrative Skill Development and Service Skill 
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 Development, SOC features 5 and 6, were developed in an attempt to integrate knowledge from 
cognitive psychology, organization development, and systems theory.  The literature indicates 
that expertise is developed through experience and training (Brenner, 1984; Voss & Post, 1988; 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2:   
 
Features of SOC 1 and SOC 11 
 
SOC 1 Features SOC 11 Features Description of difference 
1. Governance 1. Governance 
A. Uncalibrated indicators of 
change 
 
Added to SOC 11 
2. Financial Resources 2. Financial Resources 
   A. Financial  Vulnerability 
Added to SOC 11 
3. Service System maturity 
    
3. Organizational  maturity 
  A. Administrative      
Differentiation 
  B. Vertical & horizontal 
 Differentiation 
Redefined for greater 
precision as organizational 
maturity in SOC 11. 
4. Role Specialization & 
Function (Administrative 
capacity) 
 Deleted on SOC 11 and 
incorporated as sub-feature in 
both internal operations and 
core services on SOC 11. 
5. Administrative Skill 
Development 
   
 
4. Internal operations 
  A.  Financial systems 
  B.  Management 
       Information systems 
  C. Communications 
  D. Human Resource 
       Systems 
  E.  Development 
Redefined Administrative 
Skill Development as sub-
features of internal operations 
in SOC 11. 
6. Service Skill Development 5.  Core Services (each service 
rated separately) 
  A.   Infrastructure 
  B.  Technology 
  C. Role differentiation 
  D.  Task specialization 
  E. Expertise of key staff 
1. Domain expertise 
    2.   Functional expertise       
Redefined Service Skill 
Development as sub-features 
of each core services in SOC 
11. 
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 Ericcson & Smith, 1991; Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993).  In fact, Dreyfus, Dreyfus, and 
Athanasiou (1986) developed a five-stage maturity model to describe the development of 
expertise (although it was not yet called a maturity model at the time).  Elements of their model 
of expertise have been incorporated into the SOC.  
Cognitive psychology has demonstrated that expertise is highly domain specific.  That is, 
expertise in one domain does not necessarily translate into expertise in other domains 
(Chase & Simon, 1973; Glaser & Chi, 1988).  My experience with small community 
organizations was that many of the leading new organizations had developed a high level 
of expertise in their field, but then found themselves less prepared to function in the new 
domain of administration of a nonprofit organization.  This experience is consistent with 
research findings that infrastructure, technology, and task specialization can determine 
the degree to which individuals are able to function at their highest skill levels (Vinzant 
& Vinzant, 1996).   In pilot applications it became clear that the fundamental principles 
applied equally to what had been termed administrative skill development and what had 
been termed service skill development.   The concept of skill development or expertise 
was incorporated into SOC 11 as sub-features of each Core service (see 5C Role 
Differentiation, 5D Task Specialization and, 5E Expertise), the rationale being that 
Expertise is an individual attribute that can be measured on the Dreyfus, Dreyfus, and 
Athanasiou (1986) maturity model.  However, the productive use of expertise, defined as 
the extent to which individuals are able to function at their highest skill level, is 
influenced by organization variables like role differentiation and task specialization.  
Role differentiation addresses the degree to which individuals are able to focus on 
specific jobs, with the understanding that developing and applying the greatest expertise 
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 requires full-time effort in a given domain.   Frequently, in emerging or small 
organizations, one will find an executive director who is responsible for multiple 
functions like financial management, fund development, and program implementation.  
Executive directors with staff support in each of those areas will be able to function 
differently than directors who do not have such support.   
      
Task Specialization is used by the SOC to characterize the degree to which the 
organization supports individuals to work at higher order tasks within a domain. An 
example of task specialization familiar to most is the hierarchical specialization of tasks 
in the medical field in which several levels of skills are employed to free physicians for 
higher order tasks of diagnosis and treatment.    
    
Infrastructure (5A) and Technology (5B) were added to SOC 11 as sub-features of Core 
Services because of the strong relationship they have to organizational capacity.  The  
SOC 11 operational definition of  infrastructure includes building or office space, 
equipment, and size of staff.  Technology is treated as a sub-feature of Core Services.  
While technology might usually be considered as an element of infrastructure, it was 
thought necessary to treat it directly since many T & TA interventions address 
technology. 
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 The SOC 1 feature, Financial Resources (number 2 on Table 4.2), initially derived from 
systems and organizational life cycle literature, was intended to describe the importation 
of resources from the environment.  According to open systems theory, organizations 
need to derive resources from the external environment in exchange for their work in 
order to survive (Bertalanffy, 1968). More mature organizations could be expected to 
have more stable and adequate revenue streams (Harrison, 1987; Quinn & Cameron, 
1983).  Members of the RWJF program and evaluation staff were also concerned with the 
state of development of financial management systems.  Do grantees or potential grantees 
possess the internal controls and mechanisms to ensure that grant funds are spent as 
intended?  The initial thinking was that the answer to the practical question would be 
obtained as a function of the features of Role Specialization (number 4, SOC 1 on Table 
4.2) and Administrative Skill Development (number 5, SOC 1 on Table 4.2).  In the pilot 
tests, it became clear very early that the distinction between how organizations obtained 
resources and how they managed those resources once obtained needed to be addressed 
more precisely.    Foundation staff as well as grantee staff needed to have a clear 
explanation of which issue was being addressed in these areas.  We found that they 
frequently would be prepared to address either funding stream questions or fiscal 
operation questions, but not both.   
 
Upon reflection, the organizational life cycle literature applied to internal operations like 
“Financial Systems” in the same way it applied to an organization’s core service 
development, supporting the notion that not all internal operations could be expected to 
mature in the same way or at the same time.  To distinguish fiscal operations from 
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 financial resources, a new feature 4.  Internal Operations was developed for SOC 11 with 
“4A. Financial Systems” being one of the internal operations and treated as a SOC 
feature (see Table 4.3).  The insight from the need for this distinction led to further 
examination of what was more generally intended by the SOC 1  feature 5. 
Administrative Skill Development.  It was determined that information about how 
nonprofit organizations go about developing administrative infrastructures appeared to be 
related to organizational maturation and would be useful in the maturity model context.   
Re-reviewing the organizational literature led to a greater appreciation of the crucial 
nature of cross-subsidization to the development of administrative infrastructure in the 
early stages of development of nonprofit organizations.  Internal operations, like financial 
systems, MIS, and human resources systems, do not usually start as formal, identifiable 
systems.  They tend to start as tasks added to an employee’s existing job.  When internal 
operations do begin to emerge as stand-alone functions, they are frequently cobbled 
together by combining resources from several core services to produce an internal 
operation that is more productive or consistent than having the functions distributed 
among the core services.  Internal operations appear to emerge based on need and 
opportunity (mix of funding), accounting for the high degree of variability observed in 
nonprofit administrative configurations.  Internal Operations development can be viewed 
just like that of Core Services, and so the SOC 11  applies the same sub-features to 
describe each of the five internal operations as are used for Core Services (feature 5 in 
Table 4.2) as shown in Table 4.3.  
The five internal operations central to organizational capacity identified in SOC 11 were  
chosen to be consistent with the SABI training and technical assistance interventions.  
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 Others might identify additional internal operations or use different names for their 
particular internal operations.  The SOC 11 construction has the flexibility to  
 
Table 4.3   
SOC 11 Internal Operations and Sub-features 
 Internal operations  Sub-features 
 A.   Financial Systems   A.  Infrastructure 
  B.  Technology 
  C. Role differentiation 
  D.  Task specialization 
  E.  Expertise 
1. Domain expertise of key staff 
2.  Functional expertise of key staff 
B. Management Information Systems   A.   Infrastructure 
  B.  Technology 
  C. Role differentiation 
  D.  Task specialization 
  E. Expertise 
      1.  Domain expertise of key staff 
      2.  Functional expertise of key staff 
C.  Communications   A.   Infrastructure 
  B.  Technology 
  C. Role differentiation 
  D.  Task specialization 
  E. Expertise 
1. Domain expertise of key staff 
2.  Functional expertise of key staff 
D.  Human Resource Systems   A.   Infrastructure 
  B.  Technology 
  C. Role differentiation 
  D.  Task specialization 
  E. Expertise 
1. Domain expertise of key staff 
      2.  Functional expertise of key staff 
E.  Development   A.   Infrastructure 
  B.  Technology 
  C. Role differentiation 
  D.  Task specialization 
  E. Expertise 
1. Domain expertise of key staff 
      2.    Functional expertise of key staff 
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 accommodate additional internal operations by simply identifying them and applying the 
same five sub-features.  For example, one organization in the author’s experience 
possessed an extensive “Planning” Department that handled functions normally identified 
as MIS.  
 
Summary   
The SOC 11 is different from the SOC 1 in the following ways:  Uncalibrated indicators 
of change added predictors of direction of change from organizational development (OD) 
and systems literature that are not specific to any stage but but have established predictive 
validity for establishing direction of change that and applies to all of the SOC stages.    
   
Financial Vulnerability was added to Financial Resources to include important newer research on 
nonprofit organization funding emerging from IRS form 990 studies that reports high predictive 
validity and has been replicated.   Service System maturity dealt with structural and 
infrastructural development that was not limited to services.  The modification more broadly 
accommodates research findings from OD and nonprofit studies.  The same five sub-features of 
Core Services are also applied to each internal operation (e.g., Financial Systems, MIS, 
Communication, Human Resource System, Task Specialization, and Development).  
 
4.4. SOC reliability 
Concern for establishing the reliability of the SOC arose early in the development process 
from two sources, the SOC developer and the foundation evaluation officer.  Developer 
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 concerns focused on the validity of the SOC approach to measurement of organizational 
capacity.  If the instrument could not be relied upon to measure the same or comparable 
features consistently by trained raters, its validity would be called into question.  The 
uniqueness of the instrument required an assessment of its validity and reliability in order 
to interpret results and to demonstrate the degree to which the SOC might be sensitive to 
changes in organizational capacity, like those that the SABI project was expecting as a 
result of the training and technical assistance (T&TA) intervention.  
 
The foundation evaluation officer identified the need to demonstrate the SOC’s inter-rater 
reliability.  That is, to what extent would different raters using the SOC to develop 
capacity profiles of the same organization produce similar profiles?  This concern could 
influence the instrument’s potential for wider use within the foundation as well as 
broader use by others.  Both the developer and the foundation officer shared the 
additional evaluation-related concern that being able to report evidence of the SOC’s 
reliability would contribute to improvement of the state of the art in assessing 
organizational capacity.  None of the instruments used by other foundations that were 
reviewed in preparation for assessing SABI grantees’ technical assistance “needs” 
reported any evidence relating to the reliability or validity of their instruments. 
 
4.4.1. Background and assumptions for assessing SOC reliability   
 
The very nature of the SOC and its development presented challenges for assessing its 
reliability.  The first challenge was to develop an “operational definition” of 
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 organizational capacity possessing sufficient precision that those using the SOC in the 
same context would produce similar results (Blalock, 1972).  The term capacity has been 
vaguely and variously used for describing attributes of nonprofit organizations (see 
Chapter 2), and one could not expect to achieve consistency in applying the SOC without 
a more precise definition of organizational capacity.  Therefore, the wording of the 
foundation’s initial objective was adopted as the operational definition of organizational 
capacity:  “The capacity to successfully complete a new grant or to expand an existing 
one.”  Building capacity, by extension, is understood to include interventions that would 
improve or enhance the organizational capacity of grantees to complete grant-supported 
projects successfully.   
 
The second challenge in assessing the SOC’s reliability was to determine whether the 
organizational capacity assessment results being achieved by the author were replicable.  
The foundation wanted to determine whether the SOC process could be transferred to 
other raters who could achieve comparable results or whether it was a process unique to 
the developer’s training and experience.  Unless the process could be replicated by 
others, the investment of resources in further development could not be justified.   
 
Before accepting the proposed development, the foundation retained an outside evaluator 
to observe SOC administration and judge its potential for replicability.  The evaluator, 
Vincent Francisco of the University of Kansas, was selected for his extensive experience 
working with nonprofit community agencies.  As co-developer of the Community Tool 
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 Box, an on-line capacity building resource for community agencies, Dr. Francisco 
possesses recognized expertise in nonprofit organizational functioning and the related 
issues of organizational capacity.  
  
To study the SOC, Dr. Francisco reviewed the instrument and documentation, shadowed 
the developer in administering the SOC in two agencies, and interviewed the author about 
the instrument’s grounding and development.  He then reported to the developer and to 
the foundation his conclusion that the results of administering the SOC were, indeed, 
replicable (personal communication).  He cautioned that the material was extremely 
complex and would be difficult to master for all but the highly experienced.  This caution 
reinforced the experience of introducing the SOC to the SABI program staff  as an 
alternative to conventional instruments. Their reluctance to embrace the SOC was due, in 
large part, to the instrument’s complexity (the reader may refer to the discussion in 
Section 4.1 for more detail).   
 
The third challenge to assessing SOC reliability was to determine what expertise would 
be necessary to further develop the instrument.  Many reports describe assembling a 
panel of experts for assessing reliability of instruments in the formative stage of 
development.  Expertise is frequently described only as possessing extensive training and 
experience in the applicable field (e.g. Shepard et al. [1999] define experts as those 
having at least 12 years’ experience).  However, it is possible for individuals to possess 
both extensive experience and training in a field and at the same time fail to become 
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 experts.  Cognitive psychology has demonstrated that the development of expertise 
entails more than experience and training.  It involves learning to understand and solve 
problems in different ways.  Dreyfus, Dreyfus, and Athanasiou (1986) describe a five-
stage model of developing expertise, progressing from novice to expert as shown in Table 
4.4 below.  
Many of the distinguishing characteristics of performance at each stage in the 
development of expertise have been described in the research literature (Newell & 
Simon, 1972; Simon, 1974; Ericcson & Smith, 1991; Voss, et al., 1983; Brenner, 1984;  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4  
Dreyfus Model of Developing Expertise 
Stage 1 
Novice 
Stage 2 
Advanced 
Beginner 
Stage 3 
Competent 
Stage 4 
Proficient 
Stage 5 
Expert 
Simple rule-
based problem 
solving. 
“Backward” 
thinking 
envisions 
solution and 
follows rules 
to get there. 
Backward 
thinking with 
greater 
number of 
rules; 
emergence of 
situational 
thinking,  
Situational 
problem solving 
(different rules for 
different 
circumstances), 
can adopt a 
perspective and 
follow it to 
solution 
Multiple 
perspectives, 
rapid 
assessment of 
which to adopt, 
understanding 
of relevant data. 
Emergence of 
forward 
thinking 
Intuitive 
forward 
thinking 
problem 
solving, 
recognizes 
underlying 
patterns  
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 Johnson, 1988; Hoffman, 1992; Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993; Pellegrino, Chudowsky, 
and Glaser, 2001; Leach, 2002).   Some of those characteristics have potential 
implications for establishing the reliability of the SOC, among which include: 
• Experts (Stage 5) solve problems differently than do those who are merely competent. 
• Experts spend more time framing problems and less time working on solutions than 
competent performers (Stage 3). 
• Experts tend to see underlying patterns and relationships, allowing them to intuitively 
identify meaningful information and exclude unnecessary information.  The competent 
tend to get overwhelmed with data. 
• Experts lose cognitive consciousness of the processes they use in problem solving and 
frequently cannot describe their own methods with specificity or accuracy. 
• Expert performance is highly domain specific and does not necessarily transfer to any 
other domains. 
• Expert performance takes a long time to develop, usually requiring 12 to 15 years of 
concentrated full-time effort to become a “world class” expert in a given domain.  
• Expert performance must be maintained or it can be lost.    
 Clearly, the Dreyfus model and the lessons of cognitive psychology offer a more precise 
definition of an “expert” than that usually applied in conducting studies of reliability.  
The author concluded that the innovative nature of SOC, based on developmental staging 
of maturity, could benefit from a more precise definition of expertise for those 
administering the instrument.  Several individuals with stage 4 or 5 expertise in nonprofit 
community organizational functioning could, reasonably, be expected to detect 
underlying patterns and issues in organizational capacity more precisely and effectively 
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 than a similar number possessing equally long experience but less developed proficiency.  
Therefore, the author proposed using two other raters with expertise comparable to his 
own to refine the instrument and conduct preliminary assessments of its reliability.  These 
were Raymond C. Logan, Ph.D., an organizational consultant with whom the developer 
had worked in community organizations in Pittsburgh, and Gregory H. Turner,  a 
Research Associate in the School of Education with administrative and evaluation 
experience with an MBA.  Both participated in several field trials with the developer over 
the course of two years as the SOC 1 evolved to the SOC 11.  
 
The fourth challenge in addressing the SOC’s reliability was the instrument’s complexity 
and the dearth of systematic research on nonprofit organizational capacity and 
maturation.  The developer decided to employ a scoring rubric approach to identifying 
stage-specific attributes of the SOC features.  Scoring rubrics have been widely used in 
educational research because they become increasingly reliable and valid during their 
formative development (Lesgold, 2000; Frick & Semmel, 1978).  A scoring rubric 
containing attributes thought to distinguish the stages was constructed for each of the 
SOC features.   The attributes of each stage were initially identified from the developer’s 
experience with nonprofit organizations and his reading of the various literatures.  The 
attributes are intended to provide guidance in making decisions concerning stage of 
development of an organization for the features being profiled.  Attributes are modified 
or added through specific experience so that the instrument evolves with use.   
 
The fifth challenge for assessing the SOC’s reliability is presented by its intended use as an 
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 observational instrument.  Observational studies have the added burden of incorporating observer 
agreement as an ingredient in assessing reliability of observational measures (Frick & Semmel, 
1978).  Reliability can be influenced by observer agreement (or disagreement) and so a 
consideration for assessing the SOC’s reliability is to minimize observer disagreement.  
Therefore, a primary task in developing an observational instrument is to reduce interrater 
disagreement, thereby, maximizing agreement. 
 
Summarizing the background considerations of SOC reliability 
To summarize this section, development of the SOC is grounded, in part, on principles 
borrowed from educational research and cognitive psychology.  It is an observational 
instrument intended to be used by raters possessing highly developed organizational 
expertise. The SOC employs a scoring rubric to guide raters in making decisions about 
the stage of maturity of organizational features they are observing.  Theory leads one to 
the expectation that the SOC should become more reliable and valid as it evolves through 
use in two ways, (1) the rubric should improve both in validity and reliability as 
observational data are added, and (2) the observers using it will improve their consistency 
in scoring as they become familiar with the instrument and its use.  In the remainder of 
this section, the rationale for using observer agreement as an indicator of reliability at this 
stage of SOC development is discussed, observer agreement data at three stages of SOC 
development are presented, and the implications of these findings for the development of 
SOC are discussed.    
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 4.4.2. Observer agreement as an indicator of reliability 
 
Demonstrating the adequate reliability of a measurement is a necessary first step for 
determining its validity (Schierer, 1993).  Reliability has been defined variously as 
“freedom from random error” (Bart, 1999), “freedom from measurement error” (Cardillio 
& Smith, 1994), and “consistency” (Thorndike, et al., 1991) or “replicability” (Blalock, 
1972).  Observer agreement or consistency is a potential source of error in developing 
observational measures, and observer disagreements can limit a measure’s reliability 
(Frick & Semmel, 1978).  Observer agreement, as used here, is intended to measure the 
interrater reliability among three raters scoring the SOC.  Such interrater reliability 
descriptions are frequently analyzed and reported as some form of interclass correlation 
(ICC) measure or percentage-of-agreement measure, such as Cohen’s Kappa (Vogt, 
1999; Huck, 2004).  For this study, a simple percentage agreement is used because the 
data do not yet support a more stringent treatment and it is important to obtain an 
indicator of whether development is heading in the expected direction or not.  A more 
rigorous assessment of interrater reliability can be supported once the SOC maturity 
model with its various rubrics have stabilized and raters have been highly trained.  
However, at this stage of development a simple percentage agreement will provide an 
indication of developmental progress on getting consistency across raters. 
 
4.4.3. Data analysis 
A six-by-six contingency table is employed on which two scorers’ responses for a given 
feature are recorded (see Table Figure 4.5).  The five stages of maturation of the SOC 
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 maturity model are indicated as “Stage 1” through “Stage 5.”  A sixth stage, “Unrated,” 
has been added to provide for cases in which one of the raters did not score an attribute.  
The marginal agreement for each stage is defined as the smaller of the row or column 
values of a stage divided by the larger of the two values (see Table 4.5).  The overall 
marginal agreement is defined as the mean of the sum of the individual stage agreements 
(Frick & Semmel, 1978).  Referring to Table  4.5, one can see on the first row that Rater 
2 scored two attributes as Stage 2 that Rater 1 did not score (unrated).  Similarily, on the 
third row, Rater 1 scored four attributes at stage 2 that Rater 2 did not score.  The 
diagonal numbers 3, 6, and 1 represent attributes on which both raters scores were in 
agreement.  The marginal agreements are the sums of the row and column agreements 
(the seventh column and seventh row).  Generally speaking, finding agreement values in 
the range of .75 or better would indicate a high degree of agreement.  Addition of the 
sixth stage might depress the agreement values initially, as disagreements about whether 
to score an attribute or not will usually be linked to the rater’s familiarity with the SOC.  
The need for this scoring category should decrease as raters’ training and experience 
improve (see appendix for Governance section of SOC).  
Frick and Semmel (1978) place great emphasis on training raters in order to minimize 
disagreement when developing observational measures.  Among the techniques they cite 
in their literature review are use of video tapes of data collection to create standard 
observational scenarios for use in training and criterion-related comparisons where the 
reference criteria are scores of an expert in the domain.  I have presumed to use my 
scored observations as the “criterion” for this analysis.   
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 Analyzing observer agreement on a contingency table requires ten or more scored 
attributes per feature in order to have confidence in the result (Frick & Semmel, 1978).  
Marginal agreement was selected over a related analysis, nominal agreement, because it 
accommodates some categorical disagreement.  In other words, nominal agreement is the 
more stringent measure, requiring nearly perfect agreement on observations and it was 
expected that many disagreements on the SOC could be of only one stage without 
changing the underlying pattern of development. 
 
Table 4.5  
Example 6 X 6 contingency table for analyzing percentage agreement: governance for 
agency #3 
    
  Rater 2: Raymond Logan  
  Unrated Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 ∑ Row 
Unrated     2        2 
Stage 1 
  
 3    1      4 
Stage 2  4    6        10 
Stage 3        1      1 
Stage 4               R
at
er
 1
: G
re
go
ry
 T
ur
ne
r  
   
Stage 5 
              
 
∑Column 4  3  8  2      17 
 
Marginal agreement  = 1/4( 2/4 + ¾ + 8/10 + 1/2) = 2.55/4 = .64 
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4.4.4. Data collection for assessing interrater agreement and reliabilities 
 
Data presented were collected from four Small Agency Building Initiative (SABI) 
organizations in November 2000 and from two other organizations during 2001 and 
2002.  The four SABI organizations were observed by the SOC developer several times, 
and data from the files of those visits were used by the two SABI-related staff for scoring 
two iterations of the SOC as it was being modified.  Two agencies were scored for each 
iteration.  The developer visited two additional organizations accompanied by a different 
staff member, who independently completed a SOC profile (October 2002 version).  In 
both instance both raters attended sessions and meetings together in order to reduce 
potential “noise” as result of observers receiving different input and as a necessity for 
being as unobtrusive to normal operations as possible.  Several visits were made to each 
of these organizations for data collection and reporting.   
 
4.4.5. Findings  
 
The findings are presented in four tables which are discussed in order.  Note that agency 
identification has been coded to protect anonymity.  Table 4.6 reflects the percent 
agreement among the three raters on staging decisions for attributes of three features for 
two SABI organizations.  Two of five features were scored (1) Governance and (2) 
Financial Resource Maturity.  The remaining three SOC features were not scored because 
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 the number of attributes was small, well below the ten attributes per feature as 
recommended by Frick and Semmel (1978) for calculating percent marginal agreement.  
The January 2002 iteration of the SOC was in use at the time.  This is the earliest version 
of the SOC in which comparisons are possible owing to the rapid evolution of the SOC 
and training of raters to use the system. 
 
Table 4.6 
 
Percent agreement among raters for agencies #2 & #3 
 Agency #2  Agency #3 
Feature Raters  Raters 
 RS/RL RS/GT GT/RL  RS/RL RS/GT GT/RL 
Governance 35% 20% 17%  63% 60% 64% 
Financial Maturity 42% 69% 50% 48% 45%* 22%* 
 
Note. SOC version of January 2002 Observations of November, 2000 
   *Marginal agreement underestimates agreement in this instance. 
 
Each column in table presents the percent agreement between two raters on the features 
for the indicated agency.  These data were derived from contingency tables as described 
in table 4.5.  Raters RS/RL were 35% agreement in scoring  Governance for Agency #2 
and 63% agreement in scoring the same feature for Agency #3.  
 The Agency #2 was the first attempt to independently score and compare percent 
agreement, and Agency #3 was the second.  It is notable that the greater agreement on the 
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 feature Governance for Agency #3 occurred without revision of the instrument and may 
be attributable to: (1) practice is using the SOC, (2) differences in the organizations, (3) 
data in the files on this feature.  Agreement on Financial Resource Maturity was 
consistent in scores for both agencies.  However, a known limitation of the technique 
used for obtaining marginal agreement is that it can under-represent agreement in 
instances where the parties agree that no attributes for a given stage are present.  This 
type of scoring limitation occurred only with Agency #3 organization.  After analysis and 
consultation with a statistician, it was clear that the procedure was scoring an agreement 
as a disagreement which under-represents the actual agreement.  Making a correction that 
reflects the agreement on the RS/GT comparison on Financial Maturity increases the 
score to approximately 61%, thus making the RS/GT agreements very consistent on this 
feature for both observations.  
Table 4.7 contains the percent agreements on three SOC features, Governance, Financial 
Maturity, and Organizational Maturity, among the three raters for the July 2002 version 
of the SOC applied to two additional organizations.  The revisions to the Organizational 
Maturity feature were a sufficient improvement that we were able to derive scores that 
were not out of line with those of the other features, Governance and Financial Maturity.   
The results of this exercise are mixed.  On one hand, the RS/GT ratings were in greater 
agreement than on the earlier version.  On the other hand, the RS/RL comparison 
indicates more disagreement with this version than that found on the earlier version.   
Specifically, the agreement of 18% on Financial Maturity and 21% on Organizational  
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Table 4.7 
 
Percent agreement among raters for agencies #4 & #5 
 
        
 Agency #4 
 
 Agency #5  
Feature Raters  Raters 
 RS/RL RS/GT GT/RL  RS/RL RS/GT GT/RL 
Governance 35% 59% 62%  44% 100% 44% 
Financial Maturity 18% 68% 15%  28% 70% 43% 
Organizational Maturity 21% 60% 29%  35% 49%* 60%* 
  Note. SOC version of July, 2002, Observations of November, 2000  
*Marginal agreement underestimates agreement in this instance 
Maturity for Agency #4  do not appear to indicate adequate agreement.   The reader will 
recall that the RS ratings are those of the developer and interpreted as the criterion rating 
for this analysis.  Therefore, it is not surprising that as the RS/GT agreements improve, 
the GT/RL agreements will tend to look more like the RS/RL agreements.  Several 
factors were examined as possibly contributing to an apparent increase in the number of 
disagreements between the two raters.  Three possible factors will be discussed, (1) the 
revisions might not have improved the validity of the instrument, (2) the raters could 
have been scoring data differently, and (3) some limitations may be due to the application 
of marginal agreements to this data.   
1. The revisions might not have improved the validity of the instrument.  I considered the 
possibility that the revisions to the SOC had an effect opposite to that intended, namely 
that they did not improve the validity of the instrument.  However, as the percentage 
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 agreement appeared to decrease somewhat between RS/RL, it increased between  RS/GT.  
Also, the Organizational Maturity feature was improved to the point that it could be 
scored, and those scores were similar to the agreements on the other features.  Therefore, 
reliability was unlikely to be regressing and some other factor might explain the changes. 
2.  The raters could have been scoring data differently.  If some of the organizational 
attributes being observed to make developmental stage decisions were ambiguous, the 
result might be one rater scoring one way and the other scoring another.  Assume that an 
observed attribute could be interpreted by one rater as indicating stage two development, 
and the same attribute is interpreted as indicating stage three development by another.  
The result would appear as a disagreement.  In practice, I have found instances of 
attributes being ambiguous when organizational features are in a state of transition.  A 
protocol was established to guide decisions when this kind of ambiguity is encountered.  
The rater is instructed to determine the direction of the change, whether from a lower 
stage of maturity to a higher one or from a higher stage to a lower one.  The attribute is 
scored at the beginning point of the transition (the “from” and not the “to”).  Given the 
need to deal with ambiguity in the use of the SOC, the existence of scoring differences 
could not be ruled out.   
3. There are some limitations in the application of marginal agreement measures to this 
data.  The chief limitation of using simple percentage marginal agreement for this study 
is that it does not take into account the distance of disagreements.  That is it does not 
distinguish between disagreements that are only one stage of development apart and those 
that are three or four stages apart.  If ambiguous attributes are causing the disagreements, 
as described in (2) above, then one would expect to find single stage disagreements when 
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 they occur.  It would be helpful to have a measure that took into account the distance 
between the disagreements.  Kendall’s coefficient of concordance appears to be such a 
measure and has been used for that purpose in the medical education literature (Olson et 
al., 2003).  However, Kendall’s coefficient is for ranked data and is not appropriate for 
the type of rated data that the SOC produces.  Therefore, a further analysis was 
completed on the data used for table 4.6 to assess the percentage of disagreements that 
were of the single-stage variety.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.8 
below.  As can be seen, single-stage disagreements account for a vast majority of the 
disagreements.  This finding suggests to me that the SOC’s interrater reliability is more 
adequate for the purpose of making stage of development decisions for the three features 
than the marginal agreement scores reflect. 
 
Table 4.8 
Percent of Disagreements That Are of One Stage  
 
        
 Agency #4  Agency #5 
Feature Raters  Raters 
 RS/RL RS/GT GT/RL  RS/RL RS/GT GT/RL 
Governance 92% 40% 71%  71% 100% 71% 
Financial Maturity 90% 100% 76%  75% 67% 50% 
Organizational  Maturity 100% 100% 60%  67% 75% 75% 
Note. SOC version of July, 2002 Observations of November, 2000 
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The preceding analyses (Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8) are based on ratings of site-visit data from files.  
In a sense, they could be considered much like the “standard patients” used in problem based 
learning (PBLs) in medical education and in “standard classrooms” used to train classroom 
observers.  The data presented next consists of two observers making independent observations 
on-site.  RS/GT scored Agency #6, and RS/RL scored Agency #1 using the October 2002 
version of the SOC 11.  Each SOC score was based on several site visits over time conducted to 
develop an organizational profile based on the SOC record. 
 
The SOC results were shared with the agencies in presentations to staff and,  in the case of 
Agency #1, the board.  The reliability rating for Agency #1 is relatively high.  Cohen’s Kappa of 
.80 or better is considered to be highly reliable for observational instruments (Frick & Semmel, 
1978).  The reliability rating for Agency #6 is only moderate, with the exception of the rating of 
the Financial Maturity rating, which is high.  Some factors that may contribute to the variation of 
reliability rating between the two organizations are worth mentioning.  First, the two 
organizations vary considerably in size.  Agency #1 had an annual operating budget of $2.3 
million and a staff of approximately 30 employees at the time it was observed.  Agency #6 had a 
budget of $11.5 million supporting a staff of more than 200 employees.  Agency #6 was observed 
over a three-day period.  Agency #1 was observed for approximately the same time over a span 
of several weeks.  Agency #6 is multi-sited and it was not possible to visit all sites in the time 
available.  Agency #1 operates from a single site, and all projects were observed directly by the 
raters.   
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 Table 4.9  
Interrater Reliability of Two On-site Observations 
 
 Agency #6 Agency #1 
SOC Feature Raters RS/GT Raters RS/RL 
 % Agreement Cohen’s ĸ % Agreement Cohen’s ĸ 
Governance 34% 0.41 89% 0.83 
Financial 
Maturity 
85% 0.84 84% 0.82 
Organizational  
Maturity 
61% 0.49 81% 0.81 
Note.  SOC version of October, 2002 
 
Therefore, Agency #6 presented challenges to the raters in terms of its size and complexity.   In 
analyzing the reliability ratings of this organization, the raters reflected that they had worked 
well as a team by alternating asking questions, giving the other some time during which to record 
the answer to the previous question.  The effect was that they were able to cover more territory in 
a shorter time period than otherwise would have been possible.  However, an unintended effect 
of this teamwork is the possibility that the two raters were attending to and recording somewhat 
different data.  Frick and Semmel (1978) caution that observer agreement cannot be established 
when the observers are observing different phenomena.  Inspection of the contingency table for 
the Governance feature revealed that all of the disagreements occurred when one rater did not 
stage-score an attribute while the other rater did supporting the possibility that the raters were 
attending to different information.  This was not the case with the Organizational Maturity 
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 feature, where all of the disagreements were of the single-stage variety discussed earlier. 
 
Summary 
SOC reliability was estimated on three successive iterations of the SOC 11, the January 
2002, the July, 2002, and the October, 2002 revisions.  Field notes from two SABI 
grantee site visits was scored by the developer and two co-workers in January and two 
other grantees were scored in July as part of the process of pilot testing versions of SOC 
1 through SOC 11.  A final set of observations was conducted in the field with the 
developer and a co-worker making independent observations in each case, using the 
October, 2002 revision of the SOC 11.  
 
The January version of the SOC produced agreements among all raters on Financial Maturity, 
ranging from 42% to 69% with one exception (22%) between two raters on Agency #3.  That 
score reflects a limitation in marginal agreements occurring when two raters fail to score in 
contiguous stages leaving a center stage blank.  Agreements on Governance varied with higher 
and consistent agreement on Agency #3 and both lower and inconsistent agreement on Agency 
#2. 
 
The agreements on the July version of the SOC on three features; Governance, Financial 
Maturity, and Organizational Maturity, produced variations similar to that of the January 
version, and did not produce acceptable reliability.  However, the scores did reveal that 
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 the developer and one rater improved reliability with agreements reaching 60% or better 
on most features for both agencies.   
  
The developer and one rater (GT) independently scored the October version of the SOC 
for Agency #6 during a site visit.  Interrater reliability was estimated using Cohen’s 
Kappa.  The following values were obtained:  Governance .41, Financial Maturity .84, 
and Organizational Maturity .49.  Similarly, the developer and the other rater (RL) 
independently scored SOC 11 at site visits to Agency #1, with the following results: 
Governance .83, Financial Maturity .82, Organizational Maturity .81.  Agreements of .80 
are considered acceptable agreement on observational instruments by Frick and Semmel 
(1978). 
 
These quantitative results fail to establish that the three raters were able to consistently rate an 
organizations stage of maturation with different iterations of the SOC.  This result was not 
unexpected and may be attributable to several factors discussed as follows:   
1. A flawed test.  The initial scores were based on field notes of the developer and not 
independent observations. 
2. Insufficient rater training.  The scorers might not have been adequately trained to 
produce consistent ratings. 
3. Incomplete development of the instrument.  The SOC is still evolving and observational 
development theory would suggest that it will improve in reliability with each revision. 
4. Flawed or inappropriate measure of reliability.  Percent marginal agreement and 
Cohen’s Kappa are appropriate for rating scales like classroom observational scales that 
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 have anchor points.  They have the property of under-estimating reliability if raters both 
agree that one of the features has no attributes of the same stage.  No score will be 
indicated for that stage. The effect is to increase the number of marginals (the 
denominator in the formula) and a marginal value of zero.  A second flaw with the 
measures is that they do not take into account the distance of disagreements.  Single stage 
disagreements are treated the same as disagreements  of two or more stages.  Table 4.7 
shows that single-stage disagreements are a large majority of the disagreements 
occurring. 
5. The SOC was going through revisions when the interrater data were collected.         
The generally increasing agreement through time and the high agreement for RS/RL at Agency 
#1 are promising.  Support for this view also comes from the likelihood that the RS/GT raters 
were likely attending to somewhat differing data at times as well as the high agreement on 
Financial Maturity.  
 
4.5. Evidence of the construct validity of the SOC 
 
This section presents evidence that the SOC measures nonprofit service organization’s 
capacity to undertake new or expanded projects, a construct that it is designed to 
measure.  Construct validity is required if a new instrument is measuring attributes that 
have not been operationally defined (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).  In their foundation 
paper on construct validation, Cronbach and Meehl (1955) counsel that construct 
validation must be investigated when no criterion is available that is fully valid.  Further, 
they observe that, “Construct validity is not to be identified solely by particular 
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 investigative procedures, but by the orientation of the investigator.”  They clearly 
describe the circumstance of the SOC for which no other instrument is available to 
directly measure the attribute of nonprofit organizations we term “capacity.”      
 
Instrument development frequently relies on the judgment of experts (defined as highly 
experienced and knowledgeable professionals) in relevant domains to render judgments 
of the validity of a new instrument to measure the attribute it purports to measure.  Earlier 
in this chapter it was reported that an expert, Dr. Francisco, studied an early draft and 
observed its administration.  His efforts constituted a first step of several in the use of 
experts for investigating the replicability and construct validity of the SOC.  Evidence 
presented in this section is derived from two sets of professionals: (1) RWJ Foundation 
National Program Office staff, and (2) board and staff of nonprofit community 
organizations for which SOC profiles have been developed.  These two groups are the 
primary stakeholders in the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s efforts to fund projects 
in community organizations.  Foundation staff members make important decisions to 
fund or not to fund projects and to continue or discontinue them.  Their interest in the 
SOC has been to see the extent to which it aids the decision making process or confirms 
it.  Community organization staff and boards are concerned with how to improve their 
performance or enhance their organizational development.  The development of a new 
instrument is an expensive and time-consuming process.  From a funder’s perspective, it 
is also a high-risk investment that may or may not be of value.  Nonetheless many RWJF 
staff members have been generally supportive of the SOC development from the outset.  
Clear evidence of that is best exemplified in the continuing support of the developmental 
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 effort and the interest shown in the SOC for potential use by program and finance 
officers.  More substantial evidence of the SOC’s usefulness came from a trial of the 
SOC process undertaken by one of the foundation’s national program offices, the Local 
Initiative Funding Partner’s (LIFP).  Three organizations were selected in which to pilot 
the SOC, with a deputy director of the LIFP office participating as an 
participant/observer.  The organizations selected were small (operating budgets of 
$250,000 to $600,000).  Two were newly formed organizations and one was about 30 
years old.  Two were community health clinics and one provided a range of services to 
cancer patients.  The relatively small size of these organizations was of concern to LIFP 
because it suggested a greater likelihood that the organizations would not be able to 
sustain their new efforts.  The SOC was administered during a site visit lasting 
approximately one and a half days during which interviews were held with key staff and 
board members, records were reviewed, and operations observed.  The data collected 
were analyzed and a profile of each organization was developed and reviewed with the 
LIFP directors.  A second site visit was made to share the results with the staff and board 
of each agency.  The feedback from these two sources is anecdotally reported.  In 
addition to data from the three LIFP grantees, data from three additional organizations in 
which the cycle of observation, profiling, and presentation to the staff and board was 
followed is highlighted. 
 
4.5.1. LIFP deputy directors’ feedback   
Two of the LIFP organizations being assessed were experiencing difficulties while 
undergoing organizational changes, one was undergoing a change in executive leadership 
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 and the other was experiencing changes in both board leadership and executive 
leadership.  After the SOC was administered, both directors indicated that the SOC 
process obtained accurate assessments of organizational development and capacity very 
rapidly.  They said that they were impressed that the process could get at basic 
organizational issues as rapidly as it did and uncover some of the unpleasantness 
associated with the changes through which the organizations were going. In the words of 
one, “It is astonishing how rapidly he can get them to take off their clothes and bare all in 
public.”   LIFP deputy directors both reported that the profiles did not result in any 
“surprises” or sudden new insights, although both indicated that they viewed some 
aspects of the organizations from different perspectives as a result of the SOC 
assessment.   The lack of new insights can be considered an affirmation of the SOC’s 
validity.  Both directors had more extensive contact with these organizations than the 
author.  They conducted on-site assessments prior to recommending them for 
participation as LIFP grantees.  They also made monitoring visits to each grantee.  
Because of this familiarity, it would be unusual if they learned something that was both 
new and significant about these organizations from the SOC profiles.  However, the 
author’s impression was that a degree of what Zaltman termed “pseudo-clairvoyance” 
may have occurred.  Pseudo-clairvoyance is the phenomenon of something becoming 
clearer with new data.  A reaction like “I knew that” is an example of this kind of 
hindsight bias (Barrabba & Zaltman, 1991).  The three organizations picked by LIFP 
were described as “problem children.”  They were considered to be questionable for 
continued funding.  The author’s observation was that the directors reinterpreted some of 
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 their prior knowledge of the grantees organizations based on new perspective of the SOC.  
Some examples will illustrate this point.  
A health center was considered to be deficient in financial management because it did not 
have a process of formally obtaining checks and balances on disbursements.  However, in 
practice most transactions required two individuals to complete.  From the SOC 
perspective, the checks and balances existed but they were informal.  It was pointed out 
that organizational maturation tended to develop from the informal to the formal and that 
the health center practice was consistent with its early stage of development. 
Another health center was serving only clients who could not obtain services elsewhere; 
these clients could pay only the most modest of fees.  An LIFP deputy suggested that the 
health center’s board might need to consider modifying their criteria for eligibility to 
receive services in order to generate more income to support its operation.  From the SOC 
perspective, the organization was on an atypical developmental pathway.  A normal 
pathway would be for growth in service provision to provide additional resources for 
organizational development.  In this case, growth would have the opposite effect.  Since 
growth would not produce new income, economies of scale could not realized.  Growth 
in service population would only consume more of the limited resources.  The SOC 
perspective leads to an alternative observation that a parallel activity of fund raising from 
different sources would satisfy the developmental needs of the organization without 
modifying eligibility criteria.   
The third LIFP organization was a 60-year-old service organization that was experiencing 
declining revenues and having difficulty in executive leadership transition.  LIFP was 
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 concerned that the organization was not meeting its planned goals and objectives.  
Problems related to staff divisiveness and role conflict were identified as chief concerns.  
The SOC profile identified other areas contributing to the organization’s inability to 
thrive that were not identified by the LIFP directors.  The board of directors had 
decreased by 40% in the past two years.  It was devolving at just the time it needed to 
evolve to higher level functioning.  In addition, the organization appeared to be 
financially robust with reserves in equity and investments greater than two years’ 
operational budget.  The SOC provided a more balanced view of the organization by also 
identifying attributes suggesting financial vulnerability, limited revenue streams, 
inadequate overhead, negative operating margin for two years, and declining reserves.  In 
addition, the SOC identified some of the core services as emerging (new) and not yet 
functioning at potential. 
 
In each of the circumstances presented in these examples, the added perspective of the 
SOC profile seemed to moderate the concerns of the LIFP directors about the ability of 
the organizations to complete their grants.  From the LIFP deputies’ feedback, one 
concludes that the SOC rapidly produced an essentially accurate profile of important 
elements of organizational capacity for each agency, that dealt directly with its ablility to 
successfully carry out the grant       
 
4.5.2. Board and staff feedback 
All three of the LIFP organizations had vacancies in executive leadership at the time of 
the first site visit and were searching for new directors.  This lack of executive leadership 
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 undoubtedly contributed to the LIFP Office concerns about the stability of these grantees.  
Each handled the transition differently and all had hired new directors by the time of the 
return visit, which followed within 30 to 60 days of the initial site visit.  All three boards 
reported their agreement with the SOC profile for their agency and all three reported 
learning something new about their organization.  Some examples of benefits derived 
from the SOC assessment as indicated by the boards are briefly described below.  
• One board was considering obtaining the services of a physician to increase cost 
reimbursement.  The SOC revealed that the program lacked sufficient infrastructure to 
support the addition of a physician without loss of current production.  In fact, the 
existing infrastructure would not support the addition of even one more nurse-practioner.  
The board response was to obtain additional space that would potentially double the 
number of examination rooms.  They were also exploring the possibility of relying less 
on full-time staff and using more part-time staff in order to increase the number of hours 
that their clinics were open.   
• Two of the boards expressed the hope that recently hired executive directors would be 
able to develop their services “to the next level” and improve fund raising to stabilize 
revenues.  The SOC provided the insight that placing too many responsibilities on a 
single staff member was unlikely to result in those duties being fulfilled at the level 
expected.  The problem was clarified as one of how to differentiate tasks to permit 
higher-level performance.  The boards’ responses to the insight differed.  One board 
indicated that they were seeking additional funds for an extra position to support the 
executive director on a permanent basis.  The other board decided to seek an additional 
board member who possessed fund raising expertise to guide development of an adequate 
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 fund raising effort to better support the organization’s operation.  
• One agency had a history of starting programs and having them spin off into other 
organizations after they had become successful.  The SOC identified this pattern as 
unusual for the organizational growth sought by the board.  Typically, organizations use 
more comprehensive service offerings and serve larger client bases to generate the 
revenues and resources to fuel administrative differentiation and growth.   
• Staff feedback was exemplified by a report from an agency executive director (ED) to a 
Deputy Director of the LIFP as forwarded to the author.  The letter from the Deputy is 
excerpted here with personal identification omitted.  “At our annual meeting in 
Stevenson, Washington, in October [2003], [executive director] of [LIFP grantee] asked 
me for an opportunity to meet with her privately.  You will remember that she is the new 
ED that came on board the very week that you went to give the project feedback after 
completing the developmental instrument.  She indicated that at first she thought it would 
be disconcerting to hear all about an organization so early on in her employment there.  
Instead, she said that she found it to be incredibly valuable and that it has helped her 
develop her ‘change agenda’ for the staff and services. It confirmed for her what she 
suspected from her interview process but it also helped her direct the energies of her staff.  
…[ED] was extremely complimentary about your contribution to the agency.” 
Three inferences emerge from these brief examples: (1) both those who fund projects and 
those who receive funds agree that the SOC accurately depicts important aspects of 
organizational stage of maturation for the features and attributes assessed, (2) while all 
indicated no major surprises in the SOC assessment of maturity, all seemed to benefit 
from the developmental perspective represented by the SOC, and (3) participation in the 
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 SOC assessment is not necessarily a passive or benign experience, but can constitute a 
brief organizational development intervention itself.  These inferences are further 
supported by evidence from three other organizations in which the SOC has been used in 
combination with feedback to the agency.  The SOC was piloted in these organizations 
with the understanding that in exchange for the intrusion of the assessment they would 
receive a presentation of the findings.  They were larger organizations than were the LIFP 
grantees with annual budgets between two and eleven and a half million dollars.  The 
following points illustrate the experience with these organizations. 
• Initial participants in the SOC assessment were limited to the leadership teams in 
these organizations.  After the presentation and interpretation of the profile, each 
organization requested presentations to their general staff and to their boards of 
directors. 
• Commenting on the SOC profile, one executive director said, “HUD [Department of 
Housing and Urban Development] is always telling me what and how they want me 
to change.  Now I know why.”   
• One board chair reported that the board had been considering terminating the 
employment of their executive director but had changed their minds as a result of the 
SOC presentation.  They saw that a lack of differentiation was impeding higher level 
functioning of the ED and were committed to fund additional administrative support 
positions to permit development of higher level administrative functioning. 
• A senior staff member in one organization took exception to the SOC rating of his 
position.  He was rated as possessing stage four expertise and experience but 
functioning at stage two.  It was pointed out that each interview with him had been 
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 interrupted so that he could attend to network or hardware problems that would 
normally be handled by junior level technicians.  He smiled broadly and responded, 
“Oops, you got me.”   
• An executive director of a large substance abuse and mental health services agency 
called for an appointment to review “discrepancies with the SOC.”  Worried that the 
SOC profile was inaccurate or incomplete, the author promptly met with her.  She 
revealed that the discrepancies concerning her were developmental differences in 
where she thought the agency was and where the SOC had demonstrated it to be.  
She had not disagreed with the SOC profile, but wanted to address developmental 
issues to strengthen her organization. 
•  One board had a history of heated meetings that were characterized as fatuous.  The 
presentation of the SOC profile went smoothly, with the board asking many 
questions and engaging in lively discussion.  After the meeting the board chair and 
executive director were commenting on the “good behavior” of the board.  They 
attributed the good behavior to the developmental nature of the SOC which does not 
subscribe to typical value judgments like bigger is better.   
All of the organizations in which the SOC was administered agreed that the resulting 
profile was an accurate representation of their agency.  The agencies having agreed to 
participate in the pilot requested that the SOC results be extended to staff and to boards of 
directors.  These examples illustrate the utility of the SOC in documenting the 
organizational maturity profiles.   
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 4.5.3. Summary of Chapter 4 
This chapter has presented four bodies of evidence that, when combined, cast a 
“nomological net” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) supporting the validity of the SOC to 
measure the capacity of nonprofit organizations to undertake new or expanded projects.  
According to Cronbach and Meehl (1955), the laws contained in a “nomological network 
may relate (a) observable properties or quantities to each other; or (b) theoretical 
constructs to observables; or (c) different theoretical constructs to one another.”  
Together, they converge to “operationalize” the construct of organizational capacity and 
provide a framework for elaborating on, or enriching, our understanding of capacity.  The 
first section compared the SOC with the SAT, which represents the current understanding 
of measuring capacity.  That section revealed that the features of the SOC and SAT 
overlapped extensively, but addressed them from different perspectives.  The degree of 
overlap provides evidence that the content validity of the SOC is consistent with accepted 
judgments of experts and typical instruments used in terms of the constituent features of 
organizational capacity 
. 
The second section described changes to the SOC as it has evolved through numerous 
filed tests and revisions.  The development of the SOC was predicated on development of 
an observational instrument employing a maturity model and incorporating a scoring 
rubric to aid scoring decisions.  Borrowed from educational research, this approach has 
the property of becoming more reliable and valid through time if development is 
systematic (Lesgold, 2003).  The evolution of the SOC from early versions to later 
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 versions supports an inference that the instrument is evolving as one might expect based 
on theory and past experience.   
 
The third section reported evidence for the SOC’s improving inter-rater reliability early 
in its development.  Reliability is a necessary, although insufficient, condition for 
establishing a measure’s validity.  The evidence on SOC’s reliability supports an 
inference that the SOC is becoming more reliable through time, as the theory of 
developing scoring rubrics predicts, but additional information about its reliability is 
needed as the instrument continues to mature and as more raters are trained.   
 
The fourth section provided evidence that the SOC was viewed as reflecting 
organizational capacity by key stakeholders at the foundation level and community 
organizations leaders.  They agreed that the SOC was accurately measuring capacity and 
their responses suggest that the SOC teaches us “more about” capacity and enriches our 
knowledge about the construct, two additional principles of Cronbach and Meehl’s 
nomological net.  
 
These four bodies of evidence combine to form an interlocking system of observables 
and theoretical constructs about the nature of nonprofit organizational capacity that 
support successful implementation of expanded or new demonstration projects.  Some   
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 difficulties arose from the  use of conventional reliability and validity tools that were 
developed for measures of much simpler constructs.   
 
The concluding chapter discusses some of the lessons learned from the investigation of 
SOC validity and the implications of these lessons for future research on nonprofit 
organizational capacity and capacity building.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
     
 
 
Background and Purpose. 
Nonprofit community organizations have an established role as "laboratories" or "incubators" in 
the implementation of demonstration programs or conduct of social experiments to inform policy 
making or contribute to understanding of social intervention treatment effectiveness (Iscoe & 
Harris, 1984; Leviton, 1994; Leviton & Schuh, 1999).  Funding agencies typically have two 
major goals for projects in these settings.  One is to make meaningful change in the host 
community or targeted population.  The second is to identify or test interventions that developers 
believe may prove to be effective in other communities to address important social concerns, 
such as improving health care, reducing health risk, improving HIV education, reducing 
interpersonal violence, or reducing homelessness.  Community agencies are frequently unable to 
implement programs exactly as planned, or respond rapidly to problems emerging after 
implementation begins, resulting in a mismatch between the intervention planned and the 
intervention delivered. 
 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) is one of many funding organizations using 
nonprofit community agencies extensively as vehicles for conducting demonstrations of 
innovations in social service delivery in the area of health and health care.  Not infrequently, 
agencies implementing demonstrations fail to implement them as planned or fail to complete 
them.  The RWJF staff observed that failures in community agencies seemed related to 
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 organizational capacity to undertake new or expanded projects.  Subsequently, RWJF initiated an 
experiment, the Small Agency Building Initiative (SABI), to explore capacity building prior to 
grant making or grant expansion in hopes of improving the success rate when community 
organizations implement demonstration or new programs.  The work reported here emanates 
from evaluation work on SABI to develop instrumentation appropriate for studying 
organizational capacity begun in 1999.   
 
A maturity model approach formed the basis for development of the SOC instrument.  A 
maturity model is defined as involving a set of features and a related set of levels or stages 
(Lesgold, 2000; 2003).  A scoring rubric containing attributes of each feature for each stage of 
development is employed as a guide for assessing the stages of development of the features at the 
time of observation.  One advantage of this approach was its observational nature.  Observational 
instruments developed in this fashion usually evolve with use, becoming increasingly reliable 
and valid through iterative improvements in scoring rubrics and better training of observers 
(Frick & Semmel, 1978).   
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the validity of a maturity model for staging the 
organizational capacity of nonprofit community organizations that affects their ability to 
implement or sustain social interventions or demonstration programs.  This chapter summarizes 
what was learned during the course of the study and concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of those lessons for future research.  This discussion is guided by a slight paraphrase 
taken from Cronbach and Meehl (1955): “The problem is not to conclude that the instrument ‘is 
valid’ for measuring nonprofit organizational capacity.  The task is to state as definitely as 
 132
 possible the degree of validity the SOC is presumed to have.”   
 
Establishing the validity of the SOC as a measure of organizational capacity was a concern from 
its inception.  Few of the instruments reviewed as possible candidates for use by the SABI 
project to measure organizational capacity contained evidence of their validity or reliability.  
When validity was discussed, it was related to face validity, agreement among “experts” that it 
would measure organizational capacity.   The conventional approach to measuring organizational 
capacity was judged to be insufficient to meet the needs of the SABI project on several grounds, 
including unclear operationalization of what is meant by capacity and no clear demonstration of 
sensitivity to changes in an organization’s capacity to successfully implement expanded or new 
projects.  Instead, the development of the SOC, grounded on precepts of maturity modeling, was 
undertaken as an alternative to a more conventional approach.  This departure from conventional 
measures concerned some RWJF stakeholders, most notably the program officers responsible for 
implementation of the demonstration initiative.  Program officers, arguably, had the most 
invested in the successful implementation of the initiative, and some of them felt uncomfortable 
straying far from conventional measures used by others engaged in capacity-building activities.  
Their initial anxiety was to see that the SOC included or addressed those established elements or 
items considered by other foundations and experts as important to organizational capacity.   
 
The SOC employed a five-stage maturity model of organizational development ranging from 
least developed or startup to most highly developed.  The features and sub-features that 
characterize organizational capacity were obtained through interviews with RWJF staff and 
through a synthesis of a broad base of research literature including: organizational development, 
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 management science, organizational life-cycles, systems theory, cognitive psychology, and 
studies of nonprofit organizations.  An abundance of information was available for identifying 
features of capacity, but little research was found that delineated attributes of features of capacity 
that characterized one stage of maturity from another.  A scoring rubric containing stage-specific 
attributes was developed to serve as a guide for identifying stage of development.   
 
A critical element of this study was to investigate the validity of the features, sub-
features, and attributes of the SOC as a maturity model.  Estimating the validity of the 
SOC was based on evidence from four sources: (a) the initial development of the central 
features of organizational capacity and the maturity model, (b) an analysis of the 
revisions of the initial SOC based on field trials in SABI grantees and in nonprofit 
community agencies in Pittsburgh, (c) initial assessment of interrater reliability among 
the three SOC project staff, and (d) feedback from RWJF staff and community agency 
officials.    
Conclusion 1.  The extent to which the SOC measured important aspects of organizational 
capacity was investigated by comparing the SOC with the SAT.  The SAT represented 
conventional instruments for assessing organizational capacity since it was a derived from 
several such instruments used by other foundations for that purpose.  The SAT addressed 11 
features of organizational capacity:  
• Organizational Purpose.   
• Governance.   
• Planning.   
• Legal.   
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 • External Environment.   
• Programs.   
• Staff/Communications/Decision-making.  
• Public/Community Relations.  
• Financial Management.  
• Computer Systems and Hardware. 
•  Fund raising. 
  
The SOC identified six features of capacity:  
 
• Governance.   
• Service Systems.   
• Service or Programs Skill Development. 
•  Role Function and Specialization.  
• Administrative Skill Development.   
• Financial Maturity.  
The comparison revealed considerable overlap in the features of capacity accommodated by the 
two instruments, although the treatment of the  features was different with the SAT tending to 
focus on formal development of policies and procedures and the SOC tending to focus on the 
dynamics of maturity of the features.  The comparison supports the conclusion that the SOC 
provides adequate coverage of the content conventionally employed to measure capacity.   The 
conclusion that the SOC comprehensively addresses the central features of capacity is further 
supported by the evidence provided by “expert” judges who reviewed the SOC as well as the 
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 directors of those agencies profiled using the SOC who judged that the SOC provided an 
accurate and useful measure of capacity.   
 
Conclusion 2.  Conceiving organizational capacity as a dynamic construct in which maturation 
occurs systematically has a profound effect on the ways it is understood and measured.  The 
SAT focus is largely on formality of organizational features, like by-laws, budget and planning 
processes, and policies.  The organizational assessment produced by the SAT is static and 
describes whether an organization has or does not have a given feature.  The SOC appears to 
clarify organizational capacity by providing a framework for understanding how organizations 
do things and, thereby, providing a basis for assessing organizational potential for increasing or 
decreasing capacity.  David Wiley (1991) offers an explanation of why this difference occurs in 
the validation of evaluation measures when he suggests that we      
“... reconsider the concept of validity ... from the perspective of what is intended to be 
measured rather than the uses to which the measurements might be put.”   
 
Because “…an exclusive focus on use embeds one in the analysis of the social and 
political processes which determine and influence those uses.”  
 
        
Conclusion 3.  The SOC instruments have demonstrated both their accuracy and utility in a 
variety of nonprofit organizations by identifying the stage of maturation of the different 
organizational features, permitting comparison of the variations in maturation among the 
organizational features, thereby  enhancing understanding of potential or limitations in capacity 
to implement projects.  Not all features of a nonprofit organization mature at the same rate.  For 
example, management functions tend to mature later than do their core services (Letts et al., 
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 1999).  The SOC identifies the stage-differences in maturation providing insights into how they 
inter-relate in a particular organization, thus aiding organizational interventions to be 
appropriately focused and stage-appropriate.    
 
Conclusion 4.  The maturity model allows observation and documentation of the dynamic nature 
of maturation of attributes within each feature. Changes may be seen in some attributes of a 
feature before it has matured sufficiently to be scored as a stage change.  For example, the 
addition of a support person  to do routine tasks so that a bookkeeper has time to pay more 
attention to financial planning and monitoring did not change the overall stage of maturity of the 
internal financial system but it certainly added to the capacity of the financial system.  Another 
organization added two positions to its administrative staff to develop the positions of Chief 
Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer.  Clearly this planned change has increased the 
administrative differentiation of the organization.  Several SABI organizations increased the size 
of their financial and equity reserves, making them more financially robust.  Capacity can be 
built in small increments that eventually accumulate to the point of representing a stage change.  
The observational nature of the SOC makes it sensitive to these kinds of attribute changes.   
 
Conclusion 5.  The maturity model and life-cycle perspective of the SOC has led to an 
initial delineation of the importance of the relationship between core services and 
internal operations.  Attributes one expects to see in early-stage organizations include 
little differentiation of administrative functions from core service functions, and a high 
degree of cross subsidization of administrative operation.  Less differentiation coupled 
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 with more cross subsidization tend to indicate less maturity, greater differentiation and 
reduced cross subsidization tend to indicate greater organizational maturity.   
 
The literature indicates that good management systems and practices differentiate well 
performing organizations from less well performing ones (Letts et al., 1999; Light, 1998).  
The SOC identifies a common set of features for determining the stage of maturation for 
both core services and internal operations.  What distinguishes internal operations is the 
manner of their development.  Funding for core services is usually available from 
external sources to support adequate implementation, while funding for internal 
operations is not available from external sources (Letts et al., 1999).  Internal operations 
are frequently cobbled together from a variety of sources or they are cross-subsidized 
using resources earmarked for services.  The SOC provides an initial framework for 
systematically studying this phenomenon in nonprofit organizations. 
 
Conclusion 6.  Conventional views of establishing the validity of measurement instruments for 
assessing organizational capacity were not always adequate for investigating the validity of the 
SOC in its formative stage of development.  Multiple methods were employed to investigate the 
(1) content validity, (2) construct validity, and (3) inter-rater reliability of the SOC.   
1. The content validity was investigated by comparing the SOC with the SAT.  The SAT 
was a composite assembled using parts of existing instruments and represented a typical, 
if not exemplary, example of measures of organizational capacity for identifying T & TA 
capacity building needs. 
2. Construct validity was investigated in two ways; (a) analysis of SOC’s evolution by 
 138
 comparing an earlier version of the instrument with a later version, and (b) expert opinion 
in the form of foundation staff and agency boards and staff views of the validity and 
utility of the SOC profiles.  
3. Inter-rater reliability was estimated comparing scores of three raters at three different 
times in the evolution of the SOC.  
 
No instruments purporting to measure capacity in other than static terms were found, eliminating 
correlation or criterion studies as methods for estimating the SOC validity.  One technique for 
estimating validation is to identify expected organizational differences in capacity among a 
group of nonprofits and see whether the SOC reflected those differences.  This technique 
requires some prior work in identifying groups of organizations or differences in capacity among 
a group of nonprofits with known differences in organizational capacity.  The state of the art in 
studies of nonprofit organizations has not progressed beyond anecdotal and descriptive work, 
making the SOC an early, if not first, instrument providing a framework for comparing features 
of organizational capacity in a systematic manner. The dynamic and unique nature of the SOC 
makes conventional methods for estimating its validity problematic at its current state of 
development.  Instead, the developer has fallen back on the logic of construct validation as set 
forth by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) and attempted to cast a nomological net to make clearer 
what contributes to the construct of nonprofit organizational capacity.  A valid nomological 
network relates “(a) observable properties or quantities to each other; or (b) Theoretical 
constructs to observables; or (c) different theoretical constructs to one another.”  The SOC 
clearly has aspects of all three of these properties.     
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 The construct theory of the SOC relates different theoretical constructs to one another being 
based on a synthesis of precepts from diverse sources including: maturity modeling, 
organizational life-cycle theory, systems theory, cognitive psychology, evaluation theory, stage-
state change analysis, developmental physiology, and educational research.  It also relates 
theoretical constructs to observables by staging the maturity of observable attributes of 
organizational capacity; and the nomological network provides a framework for relating 
observable properties (organizational features) to each other.    
 
Conclusion 7.  The conventional techniques for estimating the inter-rater reliability of 
measurement instruments and observational scales were only partially appropriate for the SOC 
at its current state of development.  The SOC is a rating scale.  Observers using the SOC rate 
organizational maturity on a five-point developmental scale, from least developed to most 
developed, on an array of attributes for each feature.   These ratings can be viewed as ranked or 
ordinal in terms of the 1 to 5 stages of organizational maturity.  However, a problem can occur 
when the scores of two raters are ranked on the 5 stages of the SOC on a series of attributes.  
Ranking usually has the raters ranking n attributes on a scale of 1 to n.  There are techniques for 
adjusting for ties in the rankings, for example when a rater ranks two attributes as equal.  With 
the SOC, ten or more attributes of each feature were ranked 1 to 5, resulting in many ties.  
Adjusting for the ties had the effect of producing either unusually low or high apparent inter-
rater agreement depending on the number of attributes rated and the number of stages in which 
scores were assigned.  The solution to this problem was to consider the SOC as a rating scale of 
nominal data.  A second problem arises when one rater rates a specific attribute and the other 
does not rate it.  A sixth column and row were added to the contingency table to accommodate 
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 occurrences of this type.  It was learned that when the raters were in agreement that no attribute 
was rated in the first stage the effect was to increase the denominator by one, thereby 
underestimating the actual agreement.  Citations in the literature contain examples of researchers 
falling into the trap of applying nonparametric statistical tests developed for ranked data, like 
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance, to rated data and reporting statistically significant 
reliability scores (e.g. Olsen et al., 2003).  Two appropriate measures for rated data are Cohen’s 
Kappa and simple percent agreement.  The scores obtained with these measures are highly 
correlated, as can be seen in Table 4.8.  There were difficulties with these measures when they 
were used to measure the SOC’s inter-rater reliability.  These problems were not described well 
in the nonparametric literature examined.  The first problem relates to how one should handle 
disagreements in which one rater scores an attribute of a feature and the other rater does not 
score it.  Examples of this type of disagreement can be seen on Table 4.1 which  shows six 
disagreements of this type occurring out of a total of 17 observations.  Table 4.1 also 
demonstrates how the developer decided to handle the problem.   The most noticeable reductions 
are produced when the raters agree not to score any attribute as stage one, and yet do have some 
attributes in which one scores and the other does not.  The reduction can be illustrated by 
eliminating the stage 1 scores from table 4.1.  The resulting percent agreement is .45 instead of 
.64, the difference between encouragement and discouragement for a developer.   
 
The second problem relates to the practical problem differentiating between 
disagreements that are only one stage apart and those that are two or more.  One would 
expect more one stage disagreements than two stage disagreements, if raters are 
observing general patterns of organizational development.  Further more, a few one stage 
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 disagreements would not greatly change the central pattern of an organization being 
observed. 
   
A system that weighted disagreements by how many stages apart they differed would have 
improved the assessed reliability of the SOC, as illustrated on Table 4.7.  Cohen’s weighted 
Kappa was developed for this kind of weighting, but it was developed for ordinal data.  The 
weighted Kappa is a modification of his Kappa for nominal data.  It employs quadratic weights 
to adjust for the degree of disagreements and might serve in future iterations of the SOC when 
the instrument has stabilized and will support a more stringent treatment. 
 
Future research 
 
The SOC is a work-in-progress and more developmental work is necessary before it is 
completed.  The next step is to construct scoring rubrics for internal operations and for core 
services and refine the rubrics for governance. As work on these advances one can expect 
interrater reliability to continue to improve.  A second immediate task is to train additional raters.  
It is known that the reliability of ratings increase as the number of judges or observers increase 
(Haynes & Zander, 1953).  In addition to improving the metrics of the SOC, this researcher 
believes that the evidence suggests that increasing the number of organizations profiled will 
accelerate knowledge about nonprofit organizational maturation by expanding the nomological 
network cast by the SOC.      
 
The SOC provides a more highly differentiated construct for conceptualizing nonprofit 
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 organizational maturation than those usually described in capacity-building evaluations.  This 
construct provides a framework that allows systematic study of the interactive effects of varying 
rates of maturation of different features within an organization.  For example, a three-stage 
difference in maturity among the SOC features core services, financial systems, and governance 
has been observed in several SABI grantees.  There appear to be some interactive patterns of 
maturity in the variations in development of these features that have not been described or 
explained in the nonprofit or organizational literature.  For example, on several occasions one or 
more of a nonprofit’s core services have been observed to mature from a stage one to stage three 
before administrative differentiation matures from stage one to stage two.   Upon reflection this 
observation makes sense because small nonprofits tend to rely heavily on cross-subsidization to 
support development of administrative infrastructure.  The SOC differentiated framework may 
lead to studies identifying varieties of asynchrony in nonprofit organizational maturation in the 
same way that life cycle research did in medicine and psychology. For example, in medicine, life 
cycles studies of asynchronous development lead to two sub-studies of development (1) within 
individuals and (2) among groups of individuals (Dragastin & Elder, 1975).   
 
Finally, the use of a maturity model produced a differentiated evaluation construct that 
appears to improve the typical “operationalization” of “capacity” and “capacity-building” 
which tends to be molar (see discussion in Chapter 1).    Differentiated evaluation 
constructs have been recognized as important for improving the likelihood for successful 
evaluations of complex interventions (Lipsey, 1989; Rutman, 1980; Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002).  Two additional areas of study are indicated from the perspective of 
improving methods of evaluating large molar constructs and complex interventions.  
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 First, the SOC is still being developed and the rubrics necessary to improve observer 
judgments for attributes of features of internal operations and for core services need 
further work and validation for the instrument to emerge as a truly comprehensive 
instrument.  Second, study is needed to determine the conditions under which less expert 
observers can be trained to obtain reliable scores on the SOC.   
 
Summary 
The SOC appears to be improving in its reliability and validity with each revision 
consistent with the expectations of developing observational instruments employing 
scoring rubrics.  Several areas of additional research and development that could improve 
its reliability and validity will be summarized and briefly discussed:  (1) more research on 
stage-specific attributes for governance and internal operations, (2) training additional 
raters, (3) studies of interactive effects of variable maturation of features for patterns or 
varieties of asynchrony, and (4) longer term follow up with agencies already profiled.  
(1) More research on stage-specific attributes for governance and internal operations.  The 
literature on organizational life-cycles and maturity models upon which the SOC was 
based suggested that nonprofits mature by stages.  Experience with the SOC confirms 
that patterns of development can be described.  However, there is virtually no body of 
systematic research identifying attributes of each stage and attributes of transition from 
one stage to another.  Work in this area should improve our ability to develop rubrics for 
recognizing stages of development.   
(2) Training additional raters.  Training additional raters will provide a better estimate of 
inter-rater reliability according to Heyns and Zander  (1953), who counsel that it is 
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 necessary to establish the consistency of observers before one can establish the 
consistency or inconsistency of the behavior being observed.   
(3) Studies of interactive effects of variable maturation of features for patterns or varieties 
of asynchrony.  A principle of construct validation inferred from  Cronbach and Meehl 
(1955) is that the SOC generates nomologicals or hypotheses that are confirmed by 
observation or experience.   Experience with the SOC has produced tantalizing hints that 
further study of the interaction of variable degrees of maturation among features will 
generate hypotheses about nonprofit organization that can be studied systematically and 
objectively.  The example above, about variable maturation of core services, financial 
systems, and  governance could have potential for developing stage appropriate 
interventions if verified.   
(4)  Longer term follow up with agencies already profiled.  Extending the follow up of 
organizations could prove highly important to the development of the SOC.  The 
strength of the SABI T&TA intervention was relatively modest.  Organizational changes 
can be slow in cross subsidized environments.  Obtaining longer term follow up data 
would have value in determining whether accumulation of small changes over time 
produces overall stage changes.   
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SABI and LIFP Grantees Profiled 
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 Trinity Heath Center 
Mary Davey 
319 Maple Street 
Perth Amboy, NJ 08861 
 
Community Action Service Center 
Lydia Santoni-Lawrence, Executive Director 
116 North Main Street 
P.O.  Box 88 
Heightstown, NJ 08520 
 
The Crisis Ministry 
The Revrend Sallay Osmer 
61 Nassau Street 
Princeton, NJ 08542 
 
Sikora Center, Inc 
Susan Smith, Executive Director 
613-615 Clinton Street 
P.O. Box477 
Camden, NJ  
 
Woman Aware 
Jacquelyn Marich, Ececutive Director 
250 Livingston Ave 
New Burnswick, NJ 08901 
 
HomeFront, Inc. 
Connie Mercer, Executive Director 
1880 Princeton Avenue 
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648 
 
Mobile Meals of Trenton 
Barbara Smith, Executive Director 
546 Bellevue Avenue 
Trenton, NJ  08618 
 191
 Girl Scouts of Delaware-Raritan, Inc. 
Dianne Fairbanks 
Executive Director/CEO 
108 Church Lane 
East Brunswick, NJ  08816 
 
Committee for Hispanic Children and Families, Inc. 
Elba Montalvo, Executive Director 
140 West 22nd Street, Suite 301 
 New York, NY  10011 
 
The Center for Grieving Children, Teens & Families 
Robert Sheesley, Director 
The Nelson Pavilion 
Erie Avenue at Front Street 
Philadelphia, PA  19134 
 
Urban Tree Connection 
Skip Wiener, Executive Director 
5125 Woodbine Avenue, 
Philadelphia, PA  19131-2404 
 
Lifeties, Inc. 
Mary Inzana 
CEO and Founder 
2205 Pennington Road 
 Trenton, NJ  08638 
 
Genesis Counseling Center, Inc. 
Gabriel L. Guerrieri, Executive Director 
566 Haddon Avenue 
Collingswood, NJ  08108 
 
Elijah's Promise, Inc. 
Lisanne Finston, Executive Director 
18 Neilson Street 
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 New Brunswick. NJ  08901 
 
Eric B. Chandler Health System 
Rosemary McAndrew, Executive Director 
277 George Street 
 New Brunswick, NJ  08901 
 
Oak Orchard Community Health Center, Inc. 
David W. Fisher, CEO 
300 West Avenue 
Brockport, NY  14420 
 
New Brunswick Tomorrow 
Jeffrey Vega, President 
390 George Street 
 New Brunswick, NJ 08901 
 
Children's Health Environmental Coalition 
Elizabeth H. Sword, Executive Director 
P.O. Box 1540 
145 Witherspoon Street 
Princeton, NJ  08542 
 
Renaissance Community Development Corporation 
Sharon Tucker Brown , Executive Director 
630 Franklin Blvd., Suite 102 
 Somerset, NJ 08873 
 
 
Local Initiative Funding Partners Grantees 
 
Cancer Services of Allen County  
Dianne May, Executive Director 
2925 East State Blvd. 
Ft. Wayne Indiana 46805 
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 Eastern Panhandle Free Clinic 
Kaye Napolitano, Executive Director 
1008 Martin Luther King Jr, Blvd 
Charles Town WV 25414 
 
Putnam County Rural Health Clinics 
Donna McSpadden, Executive Director 
1225 West White Oak Drive 
Cookville, TN  
38501 
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